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This report covers regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2006, including the design, 
construction and operation of nuclear facilities as well as nuclear waste management and 
nuclear materials.
No events compromising the safety of the use of nuclear energy occurred at the Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa nuclear power plants. The doses of all nuclear power plant workers were below 
the individual dose limit. The collective occupational dose at the Olkiluoto plant was higher 
than previously due to the modernisation of the Olkiluoto 1 turbine plant and exceeded 
the average dose measured at corresponding BWRs. The collective occupational dose at the 
Loviisa plant was a PWR average occupational dose. Radioactive releases were low and 
the dose calculated on their basis for the most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants was well below the limit established by Government 
Decision.
STUK’s safety performance indicators for nuclear power plants, which describe the effec-
tiveness of STUK’s activities, did not indicate changes requiring STUK’s immediate reac-
tion.
The focus of the Olkiluoto 3 oversight was on reviewing detailed design documents and 
witnessing manufacturing of the main components. The share of onsite activities over-
sight was less than planned because construction work proceeded slower than originally 
planned. The prerequisites for organisations’ operation were followed by inspection and 
audits. In addition, STUK made an investigation into the project’s safety requirements 
management, which was based on deﬁciencies in organisations’ operation that surfaced 
during the concreting of the base slab. Incorporated in the investigation were deﬁciencies 
that surfaced during the manufacturing of the containment steel liner and during the de-
sign of the polar crane of the reactor building.
No events compromising safety occurred at the FiR 1 research reactor. The radiation doses 
of those working at the reactor and radioactive releases into the environment were clearly 
below set limits.
No events endangering safety occurred in nuclear waste management. In nuclear material 
safeguards, the use of nuclear materials in accordance with current regulations and the 
completeness and correctness of nuclear material accounting were veriﬁed.
STUK veriﬁed that nuclear liability in the event of nuclear damage has been taken care of 
as required by legislation.
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation were € 11.1 million. The total costs of opera-
tions subject to a charge were € 10.1 million, the full amount of which was charged to the 
licensees and licence-applicants.
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Work in the ﬁeld of nuclear safety regulation increased and became more diverse when 
the construction of the ﬁfth reactor proceeded and the ﬁnal disposal of spent nuclear fuel 
neared implementation. In consequence of these Finnish projects, leaders in their ﬁeld in-
ternationally, a high demand arose for STUK’s experience and know-how, and their sharing 
within the international community.
The operating nuclear power plants are almost 30 years old. The plant units have operated 
reliably and, in over ten years, no disturbances signiﬁcantly affecting power generation, 
or any other problems, have occurred. This excellent outcome may entail a risk, however: 
motivation for disciplined and professionally skilled plant operation and risk-informed 
regulation could gradually slacken. Both the licensees and STUK are aware of the need to 
ward off complacency and have actively sought means to underline the challenging na-
ture of their work. The licensees have developed new methods to determine the condition 
of components and have replaced old components before their ageing becomes a threat to 
safety or the reliability of power generation. Organisational leadership and ways of action 
as well as personnel training and plant procedures have been improved based on own expe-
riences and those of colleagues abroad. The plants have been modernised to enhance safety 
margins and to reduce susceptibility to disturbances. Examples of what has been done at 
each plant in 2006 are given in respective chapters. As a result of determined work on en-
hancements, the safety of the plants has, as assessed by STUK, continuously improved over 
their operating life. STUK, for its part, has striven to continuously bring new independ-
ent perspectives to its regulatory oversight effort to maintain the operating organisations’ 
vigilance in recognising even weak signals of danger. In 2006 this principle was realised in 
particular by the renewal of periodic inspection programmes and by underlining the inten-
siﬁed utilisation of international experiences in Finland.
Radioactive waste generated by nuclear power plant processes is treated in a controlled 
way and the accumulation of waste to be taken to the ﬁnal disposal facility is as anticipat-
ed. Posiva Oy’s projects to develop ﬁnal disposal have reached the technical design, con-
struction and procedure qualiﬁcation test phase, and results have been achieved quickly. A 
description can be found in the chapter on nuclear waste management. The excavation of 
the underground research facility of the ﬁnal repository, which will take several years, in 
practice equals to the construction of the ﬁnal repository proper, provided that the project 
progresses as designed. STUK’s oversight of the work has therefore been like that of the 
construction of a nuclear facility.
The construction of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit has proved more demanding than expected. 
Delays in the design of the ﬁrst facility of this type have slowed down the project and docu-
ments have not been submitted to STUK for review according to the anticipated schedule. 
Problems have occurred in construction management and in the manufacturing of compo-
nents to quality requirements; the resolving of these problems has required good co-opera-
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tion between the parties to the project. Signiﬁcant improvements were achieved in 2006, 
however. The problems and STUK’s actions thereupon are described in the chapter on the 
Olkiluoto 3 project. According to STUK’s assessment, the problems do not adversely affect 
the safety of the facility under construction or the ﬁnal quality of components and struc-
tures.
Due to the increased activity, STUK has recruited more personnel to carry out the over-
sight of nuclear power plants and nuclear waste management. More will be recruited in 
2007. Without more personnel, it will not be possible to oversee the construction of the 
new reactor and maintain today’s accuracy of oversight, ensuring at the same time that 
the project schedule is not delayed without technical grounds by STUK. Experience so far 
has shown that accuracy of oversight and timely requirements for corrective action are 
required for the best possible outcome. Oversight having a sufﬁcient scope is desirable 
from the viewpoint of the licensee, too. Posiva’s operations in the ﬁeld of nuclear waste 
management have become more extensive and require an increase in the equivalent STUK 
resources to maintain credibility of the oversight effort. The current invoicing usage facili-
tates easy optimisation of oversight resources according to need.
STUK’s international contacts increased considerably in 2006. STUK was in high demand 
for visits and the active contribution of STUK’s personnel was required in important inter-
national projects to harmonise safety requirements or regulatory procedures. Close con-
tacts with all leading nuclear energy countries promote the development of Finnish safety 
requirements and regulatory practice but at the same time place a high burden on STUK’s 
key personnel.
STUK’s operational strategy for the 5-year period from 2007 to 2011 was renewed as well 
as the operational programmes of all ﬁelds of activities. In the early stages of the renewal, 
the entire personnel’s views on the changes in the operating environment that had taken 
place, and those that could be anticipated to take place, were gathered. In the strategy, 
emphasis is placed not only on the regulatory effort proper but also on STUK’s responsibil-
ity to develop domestic know-how and to openly communicate nuclear safety matters. The 
plans drawn up provide a good basis for regulatory oversight that supports the mainte-





The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) regulates the use of nuclear energy in 
Finland as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987). STUK’s responsibilities include control 
of physical protection and emergency planning as 
well as control of the use of nuclear energy neces-
sary to prevent nuclear proliferation. This is a re-
port on regulatory control in the ﬁeld of nuclear en-
ergy submitted by STUK to the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry as stipulated in section 121 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree.
It covers the regulatory control of nuclear facili-
ties, nuclear waste management and nuclear mate-
rials, which is the task of two STUK departments: 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Waste 
and Materials Regulation.
Nuclear safety regulation focused on the Loviisa 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units owned by Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy and the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units 
owned by Teollisuuden Voima Oy as well as their 
nuclear waste management and nuclear materi-
als. The Olkiluoto 3 plant unit of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy, which is under construction, was also 
subject to regulation. Fortum Power and Heat Oy 
and Teollisuuden Voima Oy are later in the text 
also referred to as licensee, licence applicant or 
utility. The planning and later implementation of 
the ﬁnal disposal of nuclear fuel is taken care of by 
Posiva Oy. Subject to regulatory control were also 
the research reactor operated by the VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, small-scale users of 
nuclear materials as well as the transport of radio-
active materials.
Loviisa 1 began generating electricity to the 
national grid in 1977 and Loviisa 2 in 1981. Their 
operating licences were renewed in 1998 and will 
expire at the end of 2007. The Loviisa plant units 
are light-water PWRs. The highest allowable reac-
tor nominal thermal power for each unit, according 
to the licence granted by the Government, is 1500 
MW. The nominal values for electrical power 510 
MW (gross) and 488 MW (net) correspond to this 
reactor power.
Olkiluoto 1 began generating electricity to the 
national grid in 1979 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1982. 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are light-water BWRs. The 
operating licences of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant 
units were renewed in 1998. They expire at the 
end of 2018 and cover also spent fuel intermediate 
storage as well as low and intermediate level reac-
tor waste storage. According to the licences, the 
highest allowable reactor nominal thermal power 
for each Olkiluoto plant unit is 2500 MW. A cor-
responding nominal gross electrical power is 890 
MW and net electrical power 860 MW. The licence 
conditions require that the licensee makes, by the 
end of 2008, an extensive intermediate safety as-
sessment for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. 
Requirements for the contents of the assessment 
are set by STUK.
Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, 
the Government on 17 February 2005 granted a 
construction licence for Olkiluoto 3 in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act. The new plant unit 
is a light-water PWR with a reactor thermal power 
of 4300 MW and a net electrical power of approx. 
1600 MW.
This report’s section on nuclear reactor regula-
tion describes the evaluation of safety analyses 
for the Loviisa plant units and the Olkiluoto plant 
units in operation; the control of plant modiﬁca-
tions, the availability of plant units and the opera-
tion of organisations. The efﬁciency and effective-
ness of nuclear safety regulation is analysed using 
STUK’s Safety Performance Indicator System. The 
report’s appendices contain detailed information 
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and conclusions on Safety Performance Indicators 
(Appendix 1), completed safety enhancements 
(Appendix 2) and signiﬁcant operational events 
(Appendix 3). Radiation safety at the plants is 
analysed by looking at occupational and collective 
doses at the facilities as well as the outcome of 
monitoring for radiation in releases and the envi-
ronment.
The report discusses the evaluation of safety 
analyses for Olkiluoto 3, which is under construc-
tion, plant project oversight and oversight of the 
operation of organisations participating in the con-
struction project.
Plant-speciﬁc summaries are given of how new 
or revised YVL guides apply to operating nuclear 
power plant units and those under construction.
The chapter on nuclear waste management 
deals with spent nuclear fuel intermediate stor-
age, preparation for ﬁnal disposal, and treatment 
of low and intermediate level waste. The volumes 
of nuclear fuel as well as low and intermediate 
level waste stored onsite at the end of the year are 
given.
The chapter on nuclear non-proliferation de-
scribes nuclear material control at the Finnish 
nuclear facilities and plans for the safeguarding of 
the ﬁnal disposal of spent fuel as well as activities 
in accordance with the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. 
Regulation of radioactive materials transport and 
implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) are included.
In addition to the safety regulation proper, the 
report discusses development of regulatory guides 
and nuclear safety regulation as well as safety re-
search, emergency response, communications and 
participation in international co-operation in the 
ﬁeld of nuclear safety.
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2 Legislation and regulations
Vesa Ruuska, Pekka Salminen
STUK contributed to the preparation of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry’s legislative project 
to amend the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), 
the Government Decisions (395/1991, 396/1991, 
397/1991, 398/1991, 478/1999) issued by virtue of it 
and the Nuclear Energy Decree. The project brings 
up-to-date regulations most of which are 15 years 
old. Some requirements are amended to correspond 
to the new constitution that took effect in 2000. 
Preparation has proceeded according to schedule 
and in co-operation with the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry such that key interest groups submit-
ted their statements on the matter and their com-
ments on the suggested law amendments.
The revision and updating of YVL guides con-
tinued. They are detailed safety regulations for 
nuclear facilities issued by STUK on the basis 
of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and the 
Government Decision (395/1991) on the general 
safety regulations for nuclear power plants. The 
guides describe STUK’s regulatory procedures as 
well. STUK decides, case by case, how new guides 
apply to facilities already in operation. The deci-
sions made are discussed in subsections 3.1.2, 3.2.1 
and 3.3.1.
A total of about 20 guides were prepared or 
reviewed in YVL guide working groups, with eight 
guides completed by the end of the year. The 
number of Finnish language YVL guides published 
in 2001–2006 is given in Fig. 1. Seven guides were 
published in English and three in Swedish. The 
guides were available in print and on STUK’s 
web site (www.stuk.ﬁ/julkaisut_maaraykset/viran-
omaisohjeet/en_GB/yvl/) and on the Finlex por-
tal (www.ﬁnlex.ﬁ). Swedish language translations 
were available on the STUK web site only.
Revision of the structure of YVL guides was 
started based on a project plan. The views of an 
expert group, summoned in 2005 and comprised 
of representatives from STUK and the Finnish 
nuclear utilities, were considered in the drawing 
up of the plan. Essential revision objectives include 
elimination of known overlappings and deﬁcien-
cies, making the set requirement level clear by 
removing descriptive instructions for interpreta-
tion, and reduction of detailed requirements. A 
requirements management system and a reference 
technique utilising modern IT technology will be 
introduced. The number of guides will be reduced 
to almost half and they will be easier to maintain 
and use. The revision is due for completion by the 
end of 2011.
The preparation of ﬁve guides was started. In 
support of STUK’s experts preparing the guides, 
YVL guide -speciﬁc working groups were set up 
having representatives from the Finnish nuclear 
utilities and VTT State Technical Research Centre. 
The working groups will discuss the contents of the 
guides during their preparation already, thus re-
ducing the time spent in their preparation overall. 
In addition, a follow-up group on the entire project 
has assembled with representatives from STUK, 
the nuclear utilities and VTT.
In a working group of the Western European 
Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) STUK’s 
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experts contributed to the drawing up of reference 
levels for European safety requirements. WENRA 
works to harmonise safety requirements in EU 
countries. STUK requested the Finnish licensees’ 
opinion on the requirements and on their fulﬁl-
ment at Finnish nuclear facilities. On Finland’s 
part, certain non-conformities between the require-
ment level and YVL guides surfaced. However, no 
non-conformities in their fulﬁlment were detected 
at the nuclear facilities. Towards the end of 2006, 
the regulatory heads of countries contributing to 
the harmonisation process gave the ﬁnal touches 
to the requirements. The experience gained in 
WENRA work was directly utilised in the then-on-
going work on YVL guides.
Nuclear safety recommendations are given by 
international organisations, such as the IAEA and 
the OECD/NEA. On various forums of co-operation 
STUK follows the work of other countries’ national 
authorities in the ﬁeld of rule-making. This did not 
result in any need to update the Finnish nuclear 
legislation. STUK prepared and delivered to the 
IAEA national statements on draft safety guides.
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3 Nuclear facilities regulation
Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Tapani Eurasto, Timo Eurasto, Juhani Hinttala, 
Juhani Hyvärinen, Marja-Leena Järvinen, Rauli Keskinen,  Samuel 
Koivula, Tapani Koljander, Jukka Kupila, Janne Liuko, Vesa Ruuska, 
Risto Sairanen, Pekka Salminen, Seija Suksi, Heimo Takala, Petteri 
Tiippana, Keijo Valtonen, Olli Vilkamo, Reino Virolainen
3.1.2 Implementation of regulations
STUK has in use a procedure for the application 
of new or revised YVL guides to operating nuclear 
facilities. According to it, the publication of a YVL 
guide does not, as such, change STUK’s previous 
decisions. It is only after having heard those con-
cerned that STUK will give a separate decision on 
the application of a new or revised YVL guide to an 
operating nuclear facility, or to one under construc-
tion as well as to a licensee’s operation. The guides 
apply as such to new nuclear power plants.
In considering the application of new safety 
requirements given in YVL guides to operating nu-
clear facilities, or those under construction, STUK 
takes into account the principle stipulated in sec-
tion 27 of the Government Decision (395/1991). It 
prescribes that, to further improve safety, meas-
ures shall be implemented that are justiﬁable con-
sidering operating experience, safety research and 
the development of science and technology.
Decisions to implement the below YVL guides 
were made in accordance with the procedure
• YVL 1.3, Mechanical components and struc-
tures of nuclear facilities. Approval of testing 
and inspection organisations, 3 February 2006
• YVL 2.4, Primary and secondary circuit pres-
sure control at a nuclear power plant, 24 No-
vember 2006
• YVL 3.1, Nuclear facility pressure vessels, 31 
January 2006
• YVL 3.4, Approval of the manufacturer of nu-
clear pressure equipment, 31 January 2006
• YVL 3.5, Ensuring the strength of a nuclear 
power plant’s pressure equipment, 3 October 
2006
3.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
3.1.1 Operating licence
The current operating licence of Loviisa power 
plant expires on 31 December 2007. Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy on 1 November 2006 submitted to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry an application for 
its extension by 20 years for Loviisa 1 and by 23 
years for Loviisa 2. The utility’s KLUPA project 
prepared the application. In addition to the licence 
extension, the project’s aim is to deepen expertise 
and strategic partnership between Loviisa power 
plant and the Fortum Nuclear Service as well as to 
pass on plant related information and skills from 
old to new generation. Essential project sectors are 
lifetime management, plant safety, deterministic 
and probabilistic safety analyses, plant operation 
as well as matters relating to the environment, 
nuclear waste and nuclear fuel. As part of a sub-
project relating to plant operation, descriptions of 
the plant’s operating organisation and safety cul-
ture will be drawn up.
STUK made more speciﬁc the follow-up plan 
on the Loviisa 1 and 2 operating licence renewal. 
It prepared for the assessment of the operating 
licence application, actively held meetings with the 
licensee and commented on draft documents to be 
submitted to STUK in conjunction with the licence 
application. The utility provided STUK with docu-
ments in accordance with section 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and a periodical safety assessment 
in accordance with Guide YVL 1.1. STUK began 
document review and the making of the safety 
analysis report according to schedule.
14
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• YVL 3.8, Nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment. In-service inspection with non-destruc-
tive testing methods, 10 February 2006
• YVL 3.9, Nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment. Construction and welding ﬁller materials, 
17 February 2006
• YVL 8.1, Disposal of low and intermediate 
level waste from the operation of nuclear power 
plants, 10 September 2003.
• YVL 8.3, Treatment and storage of low and in-
termediate level waste at a nuclear power plant, 
29 June 2005.
Prior to the implementation of Guide YVL 1.3, 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy submitted to STUK an 
assessment of the fulﬁlment of the guide’s require-
ments, presenting interpretations of the applica-
tion of some of the guide’s requirements at Loviisa 
power plant. STUK considered the interpretations 
mainly correct but required that the utility sub-
mits every year a description of the operation of 
testing organisations whose accreditation has been 
replaced by an assessment conducted by a third 
party.
Before the decision to implement Guide YVL 2.4 
was made, Fortum Power and Heat Oy gave their 
assessment of the fulﬁlment of the guide’s require-
ments. STUK approved it including a remark that 
required the utility to analyse the reliable opera-
tion of pressure reduction valves relating to severe 
accidents as regards their staying open. The as-
sessment is to be submitted to STUK by the end 
of 2007.
As regards Guides YVL 3.1, YVL 3.4, YVL 3.5, 
YVL 3.9, YVL 8.1 and YVL 8.3, STUK made no 
remarks on the licensee’s assessment on the fulﬁl-
ment of the guides’ requirements at their nuclear 
facility and in their operation.
As regards Guide YVL 3.8, STUK made more 
speciﬁc the YVL guide issued on 22 September 
2003 by further specifying i.a. qualiﬁcation initial 
data, instructions and control as well as the time 
of submittal to STUK of the in-service inspection 
summary programme. The licensee was required 
to submit to STUK its assessment of the fulﬁlment 
of these more speciﬁc requirements and to propose 
any actions it considers necessary.
3.1.3 Assessment of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses
The licensees update the nuclear power plants’ de-
terministic safety analyses in connection with the 
renewal of operating licences. The analyses are up-
dated also in connection with plant modiﬁcations, 
or whenever operational events warrant it. STUK 
reviews the licensee’s analyses and conducts, or 
contracts out where necessary, its own reference 
analyses.
STUK approved the introduction of the revised 
emergency operating procedures (HOKE) in early 
2006 and they were taken into use at the plant 
units on 1 March 2006. Their taking into use has 
been controlled as part of inspections during plant 
operation and inspections in general.
At the end of the year, Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy submitted transient and accident analyses 
pertaining to the operating licence renewal of the 
Loviisa plant in 2007. Their review was begun and 
will continue in early 2007. No other deterministic 
safety analyses for the Loviisa plant were submit-
ted to STUK for review.
Probabilistic safety analyses
Fortum Power and Heat Oy extensively updated 
the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) of Loviisa 
power plant and submitted it to STUK for the 
operating licence application review. The analysis 
contains a Level 1 PSA on core damage frequency 
and a Level 2 PSA on large radioactive release 
frequency. The PSA covers risks arising from vari-
ous initiating events (internal failures and errors, 
ﬁres, internal ﬂooding, weather phenomena and 
other external events as well as seismic events). 
The analysis covers power operation and shutdown 
states.
According to the updated PSA, the core damage 
frequency for Loviisa nuclear power plant is 8.2∙10-
5/year. It distributes almost equally between power 
operation and shutdown states. The 2005 core 
damage frequency estimate was 1.08∙10-4/year. 
Plant enhancements and the use of more accurate 
analyses have reduced the estimate.
The update included i.a. the renewal of an oil 
risk analysis evaluating the risk to the power plant 
caused by oil spills from tanker accidents clogging 
sea water systems. A preliminary estimate from 
2003 states that oil spills account for a signiﬁcant 
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part of the plant unit’s total core damage frequen-
cy. The risk arising from oil spills during power 
operation was analysed as relatively low because 
the plant has systems, independent from sea water 
cooling, for decay heat removal via the secondary 
circuit. During an annual maintenance outage, 
when the primary circuit is open, the risk was as-
sessed as high because systems independent from 
sea water cooling are not available then. In order 
to reduce the risk from oil and chemicals spills, the 
utility will implement plant modiﬁcations making 
it possible to take the sea water required by safety 
systems even from the sea water discharge channel 
if spills threaten the water intake. The modiﬁca-
tions in question have mostly been implemented 
and will be taken into service in 2007.
According to the updated oil risk analysis, the 
risk caused by oil during power operation is ex-
tremely low (less than 0.03% of total risk) but sig-
niﬁcant during shutdown states, i.e. approx. 6% of 
total risk considering all operational states and all 
classes of initiating event. The assessment includes 
the plant modiﬁcations under way.
Utility guidelines aim to prevent oil getting to 
the sea water intake channel i.a. by oil booms. In 
case of the threat of oil damage, electricity gen-
eration can be discontinued and the main service 
water pumps stopped, in which case reduced ﬂow 
decreases the risk of oil getting into the sea water 
channel. The utility looks for options to inten-
sify oil destruction operations and to remove decay 
heat by temporary arrangements during shutdown 
states.
In order to reduce the risk of sea water ﬂooding, 
Loviisa power plant made more speciﬁc the emer-
gency operating procedures to be followed with 
exceptionally high sea water levels. The procedures 
were revised because sea water level reached a 
record high in January 2005.
In the updating of the Level 2 PSA, the remarks 
on methods made by STUK during earlier inspec-
tions were considered. The analysis attributes 70% 
of the large release frequency to shutdown states. 
During a shutdown, the most signiﬁcant initiating 
events leading to a large release are heavy lifts 
(30%), an excessive reduction in the reactor coolant 
boron concentration (16%) and an oil spill ending 
up in a cooling water tunnel (13%). During power 
operation, the most signiﬁcant causes of a large 
release are a failure external to the containment in 
a pipeline connected to the primary coolant circuit 
and failure to isolate the damage point with stop 
valves (25%), loss of cooling in the instrumenta-
tion area (16%) and a very strong wind (>45 m/s), 
which exceeds the design bases of non-loadbearing 
structures (15%). The Level 2 PSA will be reviewed 
in detail during the review of the operating licence 
application in 2007.
3.1.4 Oversight of plant modiﬁcations
The most signiﬁcant safety improvement under 
way at the Loviisa plant is the upgrading of the 
I&C systems of the plant units. The project started 
with the construction of a new I&C building and is 
due for completion in 2014. The upgrading takes 
place phase by phase such that upgraded system 
sections are available for commissioning during 
annual maintenances. Modiﬁcations accommodat-
ing for a large screen display in the control room 
were started in the annual maintenances. STUK 
reviewed the plans for operational modiﬁcations 
due for implementation during the I&C upgrading 
and also system plans relating to the ﬁrst phase 
I&C upgrading due for implementation at Loviisa 
1 in 2007. These concern the reactor power limi-
tation system and control rod control. STUK re-
viewed the detailed plans for the buildings to be 
constructed for the new I&C systems particularly 
for Loviisa 2 and oversaw the progress of construc-
tion work. The construction work on Loviisa 1 was 
almost completed and that on the Loviisa 2 build-
ings made signiﬁcant progress.
A solidiﬁcation facility for liquid radioactive 
waste is under construction and the ﬁnal re-
pository for low and intermediate level waste is 
undergoing extension work at the Loviisa plant 
site. The construction of the solidiﬁcation facility 
began in 2004. System and facility level pre-op-
erational testing was started with non-radioactive 
substances. Pre-operational testing will continue 
with radioactive substances in 2007, whereafter 
the facility is due for taking into service. STUK 
reviewed among others pre-inspection documents 
of facility systems, systems pre-operational testing 
programmes and documents pertaining to the con-
struction of a concrete vault for the ﬁnal disposal 
of solidiﬁed waste as well as oversaw the progress 
of construction and installation. On the site STUK 




Fortum Power and Heat Oy will replace two 
pumps of the high pressure emergency cooling sys-
tem with new types of pump at both Loviisa power 
plant units. Pump type was changed because of 
the problematic availability of replacement parts 
and to enhance system reliability. STUK in 2004 
approved the utility’s conceptual design plan and 
schedule for the replacement. During the Loviisa 
2 annual maintenance, two pumps were replaced 
in accordance with the approved schedule, one in 
each redundant system part, and the relevant pip-
ing modiﬁcations were made. Corresponding work 
at Loviisa 1 will be carried out in the 2008 annual 
maintenance outage.
In consequence of the modiﬁcations, several 
documents describing plant operation and layout 
were revised, such as the Technical Speciﬁcations, 
the Final Safety Analysis Report and the operating 
and maintenance procedures. STUK followed these 
revisions and the updating of plant documenta-
tion after modiﬁcations in general. The results are 
given in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.6).
3.1.5 Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations
STUK controlled compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations of the Loviisa power plant by re-
viewing regular and topical reports on plant opera-
tion and by witnessing operations onsite. Subject 
to oversight were in particular the testing and 
repair of components subject to the Technical 
Speciﬁcations. After completion of the annual 
maintenance outages, the plant unit’s compliance 
with the Technical Speciﬁcations was established 
before startup. The licensee is obliged to immedi-
ately report to STUK all plant situations in non-
compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations.
Two events occurred due to which the plant 
units were in non-conformity with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). The 
events are described in “Operation and operational 
events”.
The Technical Speciﬁcations were deviated from 
in a planned way as well by applying in advance for 
STUK’s approval of each non-compliance. The li-
censee applied for approval of four deviations from 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. (Appendix 1, indicator 
A.I.2). After an analysis of the deviations’ safety 
signiﬁcance, STUK approved the applications.
Operation and operational events
The Loviisa plant units operated reliably. The load 
factor of Loviisa 1 was 93.3% and that of Loviisa 2 
was 88.6%. Fig. 2 gives the plant units’ load factors 
for 1997−2006. The duration of the annual mainte-
nance outage was 26 days at Loviisa 1 and 36 days 
at Loviisa 2. In addition, brief reductions in output 
capacity occurred at both plant units due to techni-
cal failures. The most signiﬁcant of these were the 
replacement of the penetrations of one Loviisa 1 
main transformer and the repair twice of a check 
valve in the main feed water line of Loviisa 2.
Production losses in nominal output caused by 
component malfunctions were 0.17% at Loviisa 
1 and 0.51% at Loviisa 2. Production losses from 
component malfunctions in a longer time period 
are depicted by the indicators in Appendix 1 (indi-
cator A.I.1g). Figure 3 gives the daily average gross 
powers of the plant units.
Five events at the Loviisa plant units war-
ranted a special report. All the reported events are 
discussed in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1).
A special report was written on the below 
events
• calibration of the exhaust gas activity measure-
ment systems of Loviisa 2 steam generators 
(INES Level 0)
• 6 kV switchgear buses sustained damage at 
Loviisa 2 (INES Level 0)
• spreading of contamination at Loviisa 2 (INES 
Level 1)
• emergency accumulator discharge test was not 
done at Loviisa 2:lla (INES Level 0)
• pressuriser discharge valves were not tested at 
the plant units (INES Level 0).
The events are explained in more detail in 
Appendix 3. Figure 4 gives the number of INES 
Level 1 events in 1997–2006. No events exceeding 
INES Level 1 occurred at the Loviisa plant during 
this time period.
A small primary circuit leak was detected in 
the steam generator of Loviisa 2 in the autumn 
of 2004. Leak location was performed in the 2005 
annual maintenance outage and was continued in 
the 2006 annual maintenance. The leak could not 
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be located. It was very small and had no bearing on 
plant operation.
In addition to event reports, the Loviisa power 
plant submitted to STUK daily reports, monthly 
reports, annual reports, outage reports, annual 
environmental safety reports, monthly individual 
dose reports, annual operational feedback reports 
and nuclear safeguards reports.
Annual maintenance outages
The Loviisa 1 annual maintenance was a brief 
refueling outage. The plant was shut down for an-
nual maintenance on 29 July 2006. The annual 
maintenance took 26 days and ended on 24 August 
2006, about ﬁve days later than planned. Outage 
extension was mainly due to the repairing of cracks 
detected in the inner sealing groove of the ﬂange of 
the reactor pressure vessel upper edge, primary 
circuit bleeding problems during start-up and the 
repairing of defects in two valves – ﬁrst in a pres-
suriser spray line valve and then in a steam line 
isolation valve (Rockwell). The plant unit had to 
be brought from hot shutdown state back to cold 
shutdown for both repairs.
Loviisa 2 underwent a 4-yearly long annual 
maintenance. On 26 August the plant was shut 
down for an annual maintenance that ended on 1 
October about three days later than planned. The 
outage extension was mainly due to the repairing 
of a crack in the inner sealing groove of the ﬂange 
of the reactor pressure vessel upper edge and the 
repairing of the damaged voltage transformers 
of one of two main transformers whose repairing 
changed, among other things, the order in which 
turbines are taken into service.
The location of a very small leak in a steam gen-
erator pipe, detected in 2004, was attempted but, 
due to the leak’s small size, this failed. The utility 
has continued follow-up of the leak during the new 
operating cycle. It has no bearing on the radiation 
safety of the plant and the environment.
The collective radiation dose incurred in outage 
work was 0.65 manSv at Loviisa 1 and 0.94 manSv 
at Loviisa 2. Occupational radiation doses are ex-
amined in more detail under “Radiation Safety” 
and in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.4).
STUK’s oversight activities focused, among oth-
ers, on the administrative arrangements of outage 
work, the work of the operating and maintenance 
personnel, refueling as well as inspections and 
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tests by the licensee and contractors. Attention was 
paid to the implementation of radiation protection, 
control room operations and housekeeping. Prior to 
the start of the new fuel cycle, the safety analyses 
for the new fuel charge were reviewed. The loading 
of the fuel assemblies into the reactor according to 
plan was ascertained. The nuclear material inven-
tory was veriﬁed prior to the closing of the reactor 
pressure vessel.
STUK paid attention to housekeeping and con-
trol room operations during outages. The execution 
of work and housekeeping were better taken care 
of than during corresponding outages over the past 
years. However, the upkeep of housekeeping stand-
ards still needs to be enhanced.
The actions to make working in the plant’s 
main control room hassle-free went ahead reasona-
bly well. As in previous years, the handling of work 
orders had been moved mostly to a room beside the 
main control room. STUK regularly observed work-
ing in the control room during plant rounds and 
found it to be matter-of-fact and undisturbed. The 
new work management system caused unantici-
pated changes in the roles of control room opera-
tors. The utility will improve the system based on 
the experiences gained.
The regulatory oversight of the Loviisa plant’s 
annual maintenance outages took 211 person days. 
A resident inspector worked regularly at the site. 
A total of 114 person days outside normal working 
hours was spent in inspection work to oversee an-
nual maintenances.
Plant maintenance and ageing management
STUK preliminarily assessed the ageing manage-
ment documents prepared for the operating licence 
application of the Loviisa plant in which the util-
ity presents the principles and implementation of 
lifetime management as well as the condition and 
lifetime extension bases of components, structures 
and systems. STUK assessed the plant’s ageing 
management process and veriﬁed the information 
contained in the documents in annual periodic in-
spections onsite.
Based on assessments and inspections, STUK 
required Fortum Power and Heat Oy in their 
choice of components to pay more attention to 
safety as well as to the technological ageing of elec-
trical and I&C components. STUK required further 
clariﬁcations on the instructions for the follow-up 
of reactor pressure vessel radiation embrittlement, 
long-term trends in systems exposed to erosion cor-
rosion, oscillations in the main circulation piping 
and the main steam tubes inside the steam genera-
tor room, thermal fatigue of the steam generator 
blow-down system and the springs to prevent ﬂoat-
ing of the reactor pressure vessel internals, among 
others.
Preventive maintenance of components of mi-
nor importance has been removed from the main-
tenance programmes of Loviisa power plant. STUK 
considers it important that, in this connection, the 
need to increase resources available for the pre-
ventive maintenance of components important to 
safety is considered. The regular review of main-
tenance programmes updates, which is required in 
the YVL guides, has not been done at Loviisa power 
plant over the past years. STUK required that the 
utility resumes regular programme evaluation.
In a chemistry inspection, the utilisation of 
data on secondary circuit water chemistry in the 
follow-up of component ageing was evaluated. The 
inspection focused, among others, on chemistry 
related instructions, procedures for the follow-up 
of component ageing at the chemistry laboratory 
and liaison between the chemistry laboratory and 
units responsible for ageing management. The in-
dications in the heat transfer tubes of one Loviisa 1 
steam generator, detected in 2006, were also dealt 
with in the inspection. They occurred in spots hav-
ing solid matter accumulations, which may have 
increased corrosion. The plant introduced new 
guidelines for secondary circuit water chemistry: 
procedures in accordance with them increase the 
options for the ageing management of secondary 
circuit components.
In a structural inspection contained in the peri-
odic inspection programme, Loviisa power plant’s 
inspection programmes for concrete structures and 
the steel containment as well as the condition as-
sessment of the plant’s structures in 2005 were 
evaluated. The utility in 2006 improved the cor-
rosion protection of steels and steel structures in 
the concrete structures of sea water tunnels and 
inspected cooling water intake tunnels excavated 
in rock. Based on the inspections, STUK estimated 
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that the structures of Loviisa power plant are in 
good condition.
No signiﬁcant observations relating to age-
ing management were made during the annual 
maintenance outages of the Loviisa plant units. 
In-service inspection in accordance with Guide 
YVL 3.8 of the reactor pressure vessel and piping, 
which is the duty of the licensee, was carried out 
at both plant units. STUK approved the inspection 
programmes prior to the start of inspection, su-
pervised the inspection and reviewed their results 
onsite. The ﬁnal result reports will be submitted to 
STUK for approval after the annual maintenance. 
STUK reviewed onsite the results of the condition 
monitoring inspection of secondary circuit piping 
made by the licensee.
The fastening bolts of the lining of the reactor 
support cage at the sites of replaced fuel elements 
and control rods were inspected at Loviisa 1. Two 
penetration assemblies for control rod drive mech-
anisms in the reactor pressure vessel head were in-
spected by ultrasound because water was detected 
in their protection sleeves in the 2004 outage. The 
amount of water had remained unchanged and no 
bulging of the sleeves was observed. They will be 
replaced in an extended 2008 annual maintenance. 
Sealing surface cracks detected at reactor pres-
sure vessel ﬂange level were repaired by welding, 
and sealing surfaces and grooves were machined 
to original dimensions. A total of 24 heat transfer 
tubes from three steam generators were plugged, 
one of which could only be plugged from one end. 
In addition, during the annual maintenance out-
age, pressuriser main safety valves and their pilot 
valves were serviced and inspected, steam gen-
erator safety valves underwent annual testing, 
two primary coolant pumps were serviced and 
inspected and control rod drive unit mechanisms 
were serviced.
All fastening bolts (312 pcs) of the lining of the 
reactor support cage were inspected, and four were 
replaced. The detached bolts will be separately 
investigated to determine the nature of the cracks. 
At Loviisa 2, two protection sleeves of the penetra-
tion assemblies for control rod drive mechanisms 
in the reactor pressure vessel head were replaced 
because water had been detected in them. The 
replacement went in accordance with a plan pre-
viously approved by STUK. The work was more 
difﬁcult than expected but was done according to 
plan. About 20 crack indications were detected on 
the ﬂange level sealing surface of the Loviisa 2 
reactor pressure vessel. They were repaired using 
the same technique as at Loviisa 1. In addition, a 
dent was repaired which occurred in 1988 when 
the sealing got partially caught in between a neck 
formed by two sealing grooves and the pressure 
vessel head. Two pumps of the reactor high pres-
sure emergency cooling system were replaced and 
the necessary piping modiﬁcations were made. The 
heat transfer tubes of four steam generators were 
inspected and eight were plugged. In addition, the 
same servicing and inspection as in Loviisa 1 of 
primary valves, primary coolant pumps and control 
rod drive mechanisms were conducted.
There were no periodic inspections of pressure 
equipment in STUK’s inspection area at Loviisa 
1. The number of inspections at Loviisa 2 was 22. 
STUK supervised at both plant units inspections 
of Safety Class 3 and 4 as well as Class EYT (non-
nuclear) pressure equipment made by inspection 
organisations.
STUK made 247 construction inspections, in-
spections of onsite repairs and modiﬁcations as 
well as three commissioning inspections.
The repair and maintenance of electrical power 
systems and components at Loviisa 2 included 
diesel generator replacements, replacements of the 
rectiﬁers of the release magnets of primary coolant 
pump motors and the replacement of one primary 
coolant pump. The repairs of I&C systems at both 
plant units included a modiﬁcation of the auto-
mated starting sequence of back-up pumps in the 
service water circuit to provide for undervoltage 
situations and the replacement and repair of failed 
relays in the reactor protection system.
The electrical and I&C technology section of 
the inspection organisation of the Loviisa power 
plant made 45 commissioning inspections. STUK 
reviewed the modiﬁcation plans and supervised 
some of the commissioning inspections. During an-
nual maintenances STUK witnessed the periodic 






The ALARA action programme to reduce occupa-
tional radiation dose was updated at the Loviisa 
plant. STUK required the Loviisa plant to ﬁrst 
evaluate what technical measures affect radia-
tion levels at the plant units. Additional radiation 
shields were used at Loviisa 2 in demanding reac-
tor head and support cage maintenance, among 
others.
STUK has required that, at the Loviisa plant, 
the control and supervision of maintenance work 
in the close proximity of the reactor primary circuit 
should be further intensiﬁed and an assessment 
made of whether the order of the units’ annual 
maintenances could be changed. Joint radiation 
protection training of contractors and acquisition 
of information on practices at reference plants 
abroad are to be continued in co-operation with the 
authorities and other parties.
The collective occupational annual dose for 
the Loviisa plant was a PWR average. In an 
OECD/NEA comparison, the collective doses for 
the Loviisa plant are higher than those for corre-
sponding Central European VVER reactors. This 
is mostly due to the location of the primary coolant 
circuit, unlike in other VVER plants, inside the 
containment building, which leaves little room for 
maintenance operations.
The individual dose distribution of workers is 
given in Table 1. The highest individual dose to a 
Finnish nuclear power plant worker was 18.4 mSv, 
i.e. individual radiation doses did not exceed the 
50 mSv annual dose limit. This dose accumulated 
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. 
Individual radiation doses did not exceed the dose 
limit of 100 mSv deﬁned for any period of ﬁve years. 
The highest individual dose to a Finnish nuclear 
power plant worker in the 5-year period 2002–2006 
was 70.4 mSv. It was received at Loviisa, Olkiluoto 
and Swedish nuclear power plants.
The highest individual dose at Loviisa nuclear 
power plant was 13.63 mSv. The collective occupa-
tional radiation dose at Loviisa 1 was 0.68 manSv 
and at Loviisa 2 0.98 manSv, totalling 1.66 manSv. 
According to STUK guidelines, the threshold for 
one plant unit’s collective dose averaged over two 
successive years is 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of 
net electrical power. This means a radiation dose of 
1.22 manSv per one Loviisa plant unit. With the ra-
diation doses incurred in 2005–2006, the threshold 
was not exceeded at either plant unit. Collective oc-
cupational radiation doses over the past years are 
given in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.4).
Radioactive releases
The plant’s Technical Speciﬁcations determine an-
nual limits for radioactive releases into the envi-
ronment from nuclear power plants. Radioactive 
releases from Loviisa nuclear power plant were 
well below authorised limits. Releases of radioac-
tive noble gases were approx. 5.8 TBq, i.e. approx. 
0.03 % of authorised limit. They were dominated 
by argon-41, i.e. the activation product of argon-40, 
originating in the air space between the reactor 
pressure vessel and the main concrete shield. The 
Table 1. Occupational radiation dose distribution at 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2006.
Number of persons by doses
Dose range 
(mSv) Loviisa Olkiluoto total
*
< 0.1 642 1166 1725
0.1 – 0.49 208 528 701
0.5 – 0.99 106 281 372
1.00 – 1.99 135 297 388
2.00 – 2.99 55 184 236
3.00 – 3.99 41 93 138
4.00 – 4.99 37 46 79
5.00 – 5.99 34 27 62
6.00 – 6.99 20 13 41
7.00 – 7.99 15 13 37
8.00 – 8.99 13 8 22
9.00 – 9.99 8 3 13
10.00 – 10.99 7 3 18
11.00 – 11.99 6 2 7
12.00 – 12.99 6 1 11
13.00 – 13.99 5 — 8
14.00 – 14.99 — — —
15.00 – 15.99 — — —
16.00 – 16.99 — — —
17.00 – 17.99 — — —
18.00 – 18.99 — — 1
19.00 – 19.99 — — —
20.00 – 20.99 — — —
21.00 – 24.99 — — —
> 25.00 — — —
* The data in this column include Finnish workers who have received 
doses also at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same person may 
have worked at both Finnish nuclear power plants and in Sweden.
 Source: STUK’s dose register
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releases of radioactive iodine isotopes were about 
0.3MBq, which is approx. 0.0001% of authorised 
limit. Aerosol releases were approx. 0.1 GBq, tri-
tium releases approx. 0.2 TBq and carbon-14 re-
leases approx. 0.1 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid efﬂuents was ap-
prox. 17 TBq, i.e. approx. 11% of the release limit. 
The total activity of other nuclides released into 
the sea was approx. 0.6 GBq, i.e. about 0.06 % of 
the release limit.
The release limits are intended to maintain the 
annual individual radiation exposure of the popu-
lation surrounding the plants clearly below the 
threshold value (100 microSv) determined by the 
Government Decision (395/1991). The calculated 
radiation dose of the most exposed individual in 
the vicinity of the plant was approx. 0.06 microSv, 
i.e. 0.1% of the set limit. Appendix 1 (indicator 
A.I.5) presents radioactive releases and calculated 
radiation doses to the most exposed individual in 
the plant’s vicinity over the past years.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Environmental radiation monitoring around a nu-
clear power plant comprises on- and off-site ra-
diation measurements as well as determination of 
radioactive substances to establish public exposure 
and radioactive substances in the environment.
In the environment of Loviisa nuclear power 
plant, 324 samples were collected. Radioactive 
substances originating in the plant were measured 
in six samples of sinking matter, nine samples of 
aquatic plants, two samples of deposition, two sam-
ples of sea water, one sample of air and one sample 
of bottom fauna.
Cobalt-60, the dominating radioactive substance 
originating in power plants, was measured in 16 
samples. Silver-110m (10 observations), cobalt-58 
(8 observations), antimonium-124 (6 observations), 
tritium (2 observations), manganese-54 (5 observa-
tions), niobium-95 (2 observations), zirconium-95 
(2 observations), tellurium-123m (2 observations), 
chromium-51 (1 observation) and iron-59 (1 obser-
vation) were measured as well.
All the detected concentrations were low and 
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
Radioactive strontium, caesium and plutonium 
isotopes originating from the Chernobyl accident 
and the fallout from nuclear weapons tests are still 
measurable in environmental samples. Natural 
radioactive substances (i.a. beryllium-7, potassi-
um-40 as well as uranium and thorium with their 
decay products) are also detected. Their concentra-
tions usually exceed those of nuclides originating 
from the power plant or fallout.
The external radiation dose rate is continuously 
monitored by 15 automatic stations at the distance 
of two and ﬁve kilometres from the plants. The 
measurement data are transferred to the power 
plants and to the national radiation-monitoring 
system. In addition, there are ten passive dosim-
eters around the nuclear power plants. In external 
radiation, no changes occurred exceeding normal 
ﬂuctuations in natural background radiation. The 
external radiation dose rate is continuously moni-
tored by 15 automatic stations at the distance of 
two and ﬁve kilometres from the plants. The meas-
urement data are transferred to the power plants 
and to the national radiation-monitoring system. In 
addition, there are ten passive dosimeters around 
the nuclear power plants. In external radiation, no 
changes occurred exceeding normal ﬂuctuations in 
natural background radiation.
3.1.6 Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
During document reviews and other inspection ac-
tivity, and based on information submitted by the 
Loviisa plant, STUK evaluates how the utility at-
tends to plant safety.
Within the framework of the periodic inspec-
tion programme, STUK inspected the I&C systems 
upgrading project at Loviisa. The inspection dealt 
with project management; co-operation within the 
network comprised of Loviisa power plant – FNS 
– component supplier – sub-contractors; user train-
ing; and the entire organisation’s preparedness 
for the introduction of the new I&C system. The 
project management procedures were found func-
tional and have been further developed on the 
basis of experiences from previous projects at the 
Loviisa plant.
Deﬁcient personnel resources in some areas 
of activity important to safety were identiﬁed as 
the most important development need in safety 
management at the Loviisa plant during 2005 
already. This was due to retirement, change of du-
ties within plant or utility, or resignation from the 
utility’s employ. STUK’s oversight included discus-
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sions with the plant’s responsible manager and the 
conducting of an inspection on personnel manage-
ment as part of the periodic inspection programme. 
Information on the plant’s human resources plan-
ning, recruitment procedures and sufﬁciency of 
human resources was gathered by interviews with 
personnel from the power plant engineering and 
safety units, and by reading related documents. 
STUK has required an action plan on the ﬁxing of 
the human resources deﬁciency established in the 
inspection. The Loviisa plant has begun substitu-
tive recruitment. The inspection results will be 
utilised in a safety assessment pertaining to the 
operating licence renewal.
Quality management
Loviisa nuclear power plant has systematically 
maintained and developed its quality management 
system according to own plans. Guidelines have 
been routinely updated in accordance with agreed 
practices. Fortum Power and Heat Oy, the licensee, 
updated ﬁve chapters in the quality manual.
The licensee has earlier compared the qual-
ity management system of the Loviisa plant with, 
among others, the standard ISO 9001 and the 
safety requirements and guidelines of the IAEA. 
Based on this, the system has been further devel-
oped by, among others, management reviews and 
self-assessment to improve the management sys-
tem and the organisation’s operation. The Loviisa 
plant regularly evaluates the functionality of its 
quality management system by an internal audit 
programme and a separate, independent inspec-
tion procedure.
Personnel qualiﬁcations and training
STUK supervised personnel training at the Loviisa 
plant by inspections of the periodic inspection pro-
gramme. The most signiﬁcant challenges in the 
enhancement of know-how at the plant in 2006 
were preparing for the I&C upgrade, validation 
pertaining to new emergency operating procedures 
and training given in the use of these procedures. 
Other important training tasks included operator 
training and follow-up of the implementation of fa-
miliarisation plans aimed at new personnel. Eight 
people from the Loviisa plant participated in a 5-
week basic professional training course on nuclear 
safety arranged in co-operation between STUK, the 
utilities, VTT and universities. For several reasons, 
the turnover of personnel at the Loviisa plant has 
been greater than over the past years, making it 
necessary to pay more attention than before to the 
orientation of those having new or changed tasks.
Upon application by the licensee, STUK author-
ised persons in the licensee’s employ to work as 
shift managers, operators or operator trainees at 
the power plant. Authorisations were granted to 
21 persons employed by the Loviisa plant, three of 
which are new shift managers and six are operator 
trainees. Other authorisations were periodic re-
newals of old decisions.
Operational experience feedback
In its operational experience feedback work the 
licensee reviewed events at own and other plants. 
Events at plants abroad were dealt with in a spe-
cial operational feedback group. Operational expe-
rience feedback aims to develop and improve opera-
tions and prevent recurrence of events compromis-
ing plant safety. Operational experience feedback 
information was passed on to the personnel in the 
form of reports and training.
STUK’s oversight of operational feedback was 
by review of event reports and the annual opera-
tional feedback report submitted by the licensee. 
The Loviisa plant has systematic guidelines for 
event investigation, assessment and corrective ac-
tion. In 2005, deﬁcient human resources were the 
most signiﬁcant problem in operational feedback 
assessment at the plant, which was corrected in 
2006. The delay in reporting, detected in 2005, re-
mains, however. In addition, the reports have not 
been fully up to the required quality level.
An IRS team operating in STUK monitors op-
erating experience feedback from nuclear power 
plants abroad. Event information was received 
through the IAEA/OECD Incident Reporting 
System (IRS). The feasibility of the experiences 
gained from the events is evaluated from the view-
point of Finnish plants.
Due to the electrical power systems failure 
at Forsmark nuclear power plant in Sweden, the 
potential for a corresponding event at the Loviisa 
plant was evaluated. The event at Forsmark is de-




No event investigations pertaining to the Loviisa 
plant were started by STUK. An event investiga-
tion team is appointed when the licensee’s own or-
ganisation has not operated as planned during an 
event or when an event is estimated to lead to sig-
niﬁcant modiﬁcations in the plant technical layout 
or procedures. A STUK investigation team is set up 
also if the licensee has not adequately clariﬁed the 
root causes of an event.
Pressure equipment manufacturers as well 
as inspection and testing organisations
Upon application by Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s 
Loviisa power plant, and in accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act, STUK authorised four manu-
facturers of nuclear pressure equipment.
Upon application by Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy, and in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK authorised testing personnel from 12 differ-
ent testing organisations to carry out manufactur-
ing-related testing and periodic testing of mechani-
cal components and structures at the Loviisa plant 
units. Previous decisions on manufacturers and 
testing organisations are valid as stated in the 
decisions. Loviisa power plant’s inspection unit 
“Inspection Organisation Loviisa YVL”, authorised 
in 2002, continued in operation.
STUK oversaw at both plant units inspection 
of Safety Class 3 and 4 as well as Class EYT (non-
nuclear) pressure equipment by inspection organi-
sations. STUK oversaw the inspection of Safety 
Class 3 and 4 as well as Class EYT mechanical 
components by the utility’s own inspection organi-
sation. Safety Classiﬁcation is based on STUK’s 
Guide YVL 2.1 according to which components are 
divided into the Safety Classes 1, 2, 3 and 4 as well 
Class EYT (non-nuclear). Components of the high-
est safety importance belong to Safety Class 1.
STUK oversaw the operation of manufacturers 
as well as the testing and inspection organisations 
it had approved by inspections as well as document 
review and follow-up visits. Their operation was es-
tablished as being in accordance with the require-
ments of Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3.
STUK oversaw the operation of the “Inspection 
Organisation Loviisa YVL, Electrical Engineering 
and I&C Technology” it has approved as well as 
the electrotechnical and I&C systems related com-
missioning inspections made by its inspectors. Its 
operation was established as being in accordance 
with Guide YVL 5.2.
Nuclear liability
The users of nuclear energy must have acquired 
liability as stipulated in the Nuclear Liability Act 
(484/1972), or other ﬁnancial guarantee, for a pos-
sible accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population and property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy has provided for damage from 
a nuclear accident as prescribed by law by taking 
out an insurance policy for this purpose mainly in 
the Finnish Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In case of accident, funds for compensation are 
available through three sources: the licensee, the 
facility’s country of location and the international 
liability community. About €425 million was avail-
able for compensation from all these sources. In the 
coming years, an increase in the sum is expected as 
international negotiations about the revision of the 
“Paris/Brussels nuclear liability agreements” were 
completed in 2004. The funds available for com-
pensation will more than triple in the near future 
compared with the current situation. Finland has 
decided to enact unlimited licensee liability by law. 
The law amendment has not taken effect as yet 
but is pending the entry into force of the aforemen-
tioned international agreements.
The ascertaining of the contents and conditions 
of a licensee’s insurance policy in Finland belongs 
to the Insurance Supervisory Authority. It has ap-
proved Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s liability in-
surance and STUK has veriﬁed the existence of the 
policy in accordance with section 55 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987).
The Nuclear Liability Act covers the transport 
of nuclear materials. STUK has ascertained that 
all nuclear material transport has had liability 
insurance approved by the Insurance Supervisory 
Authority
3.1.7 Safety performance indicators
The requirements set for the safety indicators of 
the effectiveness of STUK’s operations were ful-
ﬁlled at Loviisa power plant in all the areas where 
they had been established: occupational radiation 
doses, radioactive releases from nuclear facilities 
and the population exposure arising from them, 
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safety-compromising events at nuclear facilities 
and the condition of components contributing to 
accident risk at nuclear facilities.
The individual and collective doses of nucle-
ar power plant workers were below set limits. 
Radioactive aerosol and liquid releases as well as 
the radiation exposure caused by them to the sur-
rounding population remained small and below set 
limits.
Judged by the safety indicators, no signiﬁ-
cant safety-related shortcomings were detected 
in the operation of Loviisa power plant. The plant 
units were mostly operated in compliance with 
the Technical Speciﬁcations, with the exception 
of two deviations. The ﬁrst one was due to the 
calibration of the steam generator exhaust gas 
activity measurement system when the condenser 
activity measurement system, which substitutes it, 
was inoperable. The second occurred because the 
changed testing interval of the high capacity pres-
suriser discharge lines had not been entered in the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
No safety-compromising events occurred at the 
Loviisa plant units. Five events at the Loviisa 2 
plant unit warranted a special report. Compared 
with previous years, the number of events requir-
ing a special report is on the increase at the Loviisa 
plant. In addition to the above deviations from the 
Technical Speciﬁcations, three other events war-
ranting a special report occurred. They pertained 
to damage in switchgear buses detected during pe-
riodic testing, the spreading of contamination from 
insufﬁciently decontaminated equipment used in 
the cleaning of the reactor pool during an annual 
maintenance outage and an emergency accumula-
tor discharge test not having been done after serv-
icing. The doubling of the number of operational 
transient reports, as compared with 2005, is due 
to changed reporting procedures, which makes 
the ﬁgure not proportional to the ﬁgures of pre-
vious years. The immediate causes of the events 
have emphasis on errors made in own operation, 
whereas previously it was mainly on technical 
malfunctions. One event classiﬁed as an actual ﬁre 
occurred at Loviisa power plant: the explosion of a 
voltage transformer, followed by a ﬁre at Loviisa 2.
The safety performance indicator system looks 
also at the risk-importance of operational events. 
Events are divided into three categories according 
to their risk-importance, the indicator in each cat-
egory being the number of events. The number of 
risk-signiﬁcant events at Loviisa slightly increased 
compared to 2005. The difference in their number 
is considered normal statistical ﬂuctuation. The 
most signiﬁcant events pertained to cooling system 
malfunctions in the instrumentation rooms of air 
conditioning systems and control rooms as well as 
to safety system malfunctions. Preventive mainte-
nance of auxiliary feed water systems during an-
nual maintenance was included in risk-signiﬁcant 
events. The number of other risk-signiﬁcant events 
was about the same as in 2005 and the unavaila-
bilities at the plant were mainly due to component 
malfunctions. The events analysed for 2006 are 
considered part of normal operation and called for 
no additional actions by STUK.
STUK’s safety performance indicators include 
among others the following objective from the 
viewpoint of the condition of components contribut-
ing to accident risk at nuclear power plants: acci-
dent risk at nuclear facilities is reduced or remains 
unchanged. Risk is assessed by probabilistic risk 
analysis whose code contains regularly updated 
component reliability data, among others. Due 
to certain plant modiﬁcations and more detailed 
analyses, accident risk for the Loviisa plant has 
somewhat reduced from 2005 on.
The trend for maintenance at the plant was 
difﬁcult to assess. The number of annual mainte-
nance tasks on components subject to the Technical 
Speciﬁcations was not directly comparable to that 
from 2005 because the recording procedures on 
which the indicator is based have changed. In spite 
of the changes, the preventive maintenance/fault 
repair ratio remained at the level of previous years’ 
average. The maintenance function has thus been 
estimated to be in balance and implemented as be-
fore. The volume of the plant’s preventive mainte-
nance work is affected by preventive maintenance 
work dictated by the length of annual maintenance 
outages. In the future, the indicators should reﬂect 
the changed order of annual maintenances, which 
would indicate a functioning maintenance strat-
egy.
The slight increase in the total number of 
repairs of components subject to the Technical 
STUK-B 79
25
Speciﬁcations during power operation discontin-
ued. In plant maintenance, fault detection and 
anticipation have been continuously improved. 
Components have been replaced based on an in-
crease in anticipated failure risk. Due to these 
actions, a possible negative effect pertaining to the 
plant’s ageing is not apparent in the indicator or 
the related failure data, which indicates function-
ing component lifetime management and success-
ful component maintenance.
The average repair times of failures causing un-
availability of components subject to the Technical 
Speciﬁcations have remained reasonably stable 
at the Loviisa plant units for years. Average re-
pair times decreased at Loviisa 1 but increased 
at Loviisa 2 where the repair time annual trend 
has been unstable. Average repair time at Loviisa 
2 seems to be on the increase due to repairs for 
which the Technical Speciﬁcations allow a long 
repair time. With the adequacy of the maintenance 
resources of the Loviisa plant and its efﬁciency 
of operation in mind, actions should be taken to 
shorten the repair times of even such components. 
Production losses due to component failures in all 
systems remained small, which is indicated by the 
high load factors of the plant units.
According to international indexes measuring 
the unavailability of safety systems, the inoper-
abilities of followed systems are still at a normal 
low level. The unavailability of emergency diesel 
generators and the emergency feed water system 
were on a slight increase at the Loviisa plant units. 
The diesel generator malfunctions were caused 
by regular component ageing phenomena and the 
unavailability of the emergency feed water system 
was due to servicing during annual maintenances.
The indicator for investments on plant mainte-
nance and modiﬁcations showed that investments 
at the Loviisa plant have remained at a level above 
the average. Provision for severe accidents and a 
turbine modernisation were the major investments 
made at the Loviisa plant over the past years. The 
most signiﬁcant ongoing plant modiﬁcation is the 
upgrading of the plant units’ I&C system with 
costs resulting from the construction of new build-
ings and simulator development. After the plant 
modiﬁcations made during the Loviisa 2 annual 
maintenance outage, plant documents to be updat-
ed by start-up had been updated sufﬁciently well.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing radioactive releases has been mostly 
good. No fuel leaks have occurred at the Loviisa 
plant units after 1999.
The results of STUK safety performance in-
dicators depicting plant safety are given in 
Appendix 1.
3.1.8 Overall safety assessment
No disturbances occurred in the operation of 
Loviisa nuclear power plant, with the exception of 
some anomalies. No signiﬁcant nuclear safety re-
lated shortcomings surfaced during STUK’s over-
sight activities. The radiation safety objectives set 
for the individual radiation doses of the plant’s 
workers, the collective occupational dose and the 
dose to the most exposed individual in the envi-
ronment of the plant determined by calculation 
were well achieved. However, as regards radiation 
protection, Loviisa power plant needs to further 
enhance the handling of contaminated components 
and the reduction of collective occupational dose.
Action taken at the plant to prevent initiat-
ing events has worked well. The effects of ageing, 
among others, are not apparent in maintenance 
related safety indicators. At Loviisa 2, two high 
pressure emergency cooling pumps of the reactor 
have been replaced and operational preconditions 
in the event of an accident have been improved by 
new emergency operating procedures. The struc-
tural integrity of barriers containing radioactive 
releases has remained good.
Loviisa power plant has the procedures and 
personnel to safely operate the plant. The ageing 
management process has been well integrated in 
long-term planning at the plant. The process still 
needs to be improved in the following respects, 
however. When optimising the plant maintenance 
programme, special attention is to be paid to the 
allocation of resources to items important to safety. 
The ever extensive introduction of programmable 
technology at the plant increases the signiﬁcance 
of technological ageing in ageing management.
Personnel carrying out tasks important to safe-
ty have changed to a signiﬁcant extent. This has 
lead to certain problems in human resources. The 
plant’s human resources planning and recruitment 
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procedures as well as operational experience feed-
back are to be further improved.
3.2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
3.2.1 Implementation of regulations
STUK has introduced a procedure for application 
of new or revised YVL guides to operating nuclear 
facilities. According to it, the publication of an YVL 
guide does not, as such, change STUK’s previous 
decisions. It is only after having heard those con-
cerned that STUK will give a separate decision on 
the application of a new or revised YVL guide to an 
operating nuclear facility, or to one under construc-
tion as well as to a licensee’s operation. The guides 
apply as such to new nuclear power plants.
In considering the application of new safety 
requirements given in YVL guides to operating nu-
clear facilities, or those under construction, STUK 
takes into account a principle stipulated in section 
27 of the Government Decision (395/1991). It pre-
scribes that, to further improve safety, measures 
shall be implemented that are justiﬁable consider-
ing operating experience, safety research and the 
development of science and technology.
The decisions to implement the below YVL 
guides were made in accordance with the new pro-
cedure
• YVL 1.3, Mechanical components and struc-
tures of nuclear facilities. Approval of testing 
and inspection, 3 February 2006
• YVL 2.4, Primary and secondary circuit pres-
sure control at a nuclear power, 24 November 
2006
• YVL 3.1, Nuclear facility pressure vessels, 31 
January 2006
• YVL 3.4, Approval of the manufacturer of nu-
clear pressure equipment, 31 January 2006
• YVL 3.5, Ensuring the strength of pressure 
equipment at nuclear power plants, 3 October 
2006
• YVL 3.8, Nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment. In-service inspection with non-destruc-
tive testing methods, 10 February 2006
• YVL 3.9, Nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment. Construction and welding ﬁller materials, 
17 February 2006
• YVL 5.5, Instrumentation systems and compo-
nents at nuclear facilities, 22 September 2006.
• YVL 8.1, Disposal of low and intermediate 
level waste from the operation of nuclear power 
plants, 10 September 2003.
• YVL 8.3, Treatment and storage of low and in-
termediate level waste at a nuclear power plant, 
29 July 2005.
STUK had no remarks to make on the utility’s 
description of the fulﬁlment of the requirements of 
Guides YVL 1.3, YVL 2.4, YVL 3.4, YVL 3.5, YVL 
3.9, YVL 8.1 and YVL 8.3 at its nuclear facility and 
in its operation.
Two non-conformances were identiﬁed as re-
gards Guide YVL 3.1. The guide requires classi-
ﬁcation of heat exchangers in their entirety to a 
higher safety class. The classiﬁcation in use at the 
Olkiluoto plant is based on systems separation: the 
primary and secondary sides of heat exchangers 
could thus belong to different safety classes. The 
second non-conformance relates to a requirement 
according to which the guide is to be applied to 
steam turbine condensers as well. At the Olkiluoto 
plant, a condenser is a steel structure by deﬁnition 
and the requirements for steel structures have 
been applied in its construction. STUK considered 
both non-conformances acceptable.
As regards Guide YVL 3.8, STUK made more 
speciﬁc the YVL guide issued on 22 September 
2003 by further specifying i.a. qualiﬁcation initial 
data, instructions and control as well as the time 
of submittal to STUK of the in-service inspection 
summary programme. The licensee was required 
to submit to STUK its assessment of the fulﬁlment 
of these more speciﬁc requirements and to propose 
any actions it considers necessary.
In the decision implementing Guide YVL 5.5 
STUK presented for Olkiluoto 1 and 2 the require-
ments for the implementation a modern emergency 
control room, diversiﬁcation of protective trips trig-




3.2.2 Assessment of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses
The licensees update the nuclear power plants’ 
deterministic safety analyses in connection with 
the renewal of operating licences. The analyses 
are updated in connection with plant modiﬁcations 
as well, or whenever operational events warrant 
it. STUK reviews the licensee’s analyses and con-
ducts, or contracts out where necessary, its own 
reference analyses.
A feasibility study of the SVEA-96 Optima 2 
fuel was reviewed. Based on it, STUK approved the 
taking into use of this fuel type at Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant up to an average assembly burn-up 
of 45 MWd/kgU. It will be introduced into use in a 
2007 refueling outage.
The SVEA-96 Optima 2 fuel assembly is based 
on the earlier SVEA-96 Optima concept of which 
the Olkiluoto plant has operating experience since 
2000. These two assemblies are dissimilar as re-
gards the number and length of part length fuel 
rods. Materials and most components are similar. 
Before this, the Optima 2 fuel type has been taken 
into use in several countries and used in reactors 
having conditions similar to those at Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 – the last reactors supplied with the SVEA-
96 Optima fuel assemblies.
The Optima 2 fuel assembly was established to 
fulﬁl criticality safety requirements in all fuel stor-
age racks of the Olkiluoto plant, but the margin for 
fuel design changes is small. STUK required that 
the criticality safety of the fuel racks be separately 
inspected in case refueling -speciﬁc changes are 
made to parameters affecting the criticality safety 
of the Optima 2 fuel assembly.
No other deterministic safety analyses on the 
Olkiluoto plant were submitted to STUK for re-
view.
Probabilistic safety analyses
In co-operation with the Swedish BWR plants, 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy in 2005 analysed how the 
loss of reactor building heating during a heavy cold 
affects i.a. the impulse lines of the instrumenta-
tion area. In Sweden it has been assessed that the 
freezing of impulse lines at certain BWRs is pos-
sible if the reactor building heating is lost at about 
– 20°C and, at the same time, the air condition-
ing remains in operation. The loss of reactor level 
measurement caused by frozen impulse lines could 
seriously compromise reactor control. STUK re-
quired Teollisuuden Voima Oy to submit a plan for 
action to reliably prevent the freezing of impulse 
lines in such a situation.
The utility commissioned a plant-speciﬁc analy-
sis of the freezing of instrumentation rooms con-
taining impulse lines. According to a Westinghouse 
analysis, reduction of temperature to 0oC in the 
instrumentation room takes several hours at the 
Olkiluoto plant units when open-air temperature 
is –35°C. The freezing of impulse lines at the 
Olkiluoto plant units is thus considerably less 
likely than initially assessed, and, based on plant-
speciﬁc analyses, the loss of reactor building heat-
ing does not present a signiﬁcant risk. An alarm 
signal to the control room on low instrumentation 
room temperature has been added at the plant and 
the situation has been addressed during simulator 
training to operators.
3.2.3 Oversight of plant modiﬁcations
The Olkiluoto plant is undergoing turbine plant 
upgrading, which includes replacement of steam 
dryers in the reactor pressure vessel. These mod-
iﬁcations were implemented at Olkiluoto 1. The 
safety improvements completed at the plant units 
are described in Appendix 2.
Plant modiﬁcations oversight included deﬁni-
tion of regulatory scope, handling of documents 
pertaining to the modiﬁcations as well as supervi-
sion of their implementation and commissioning. 
STUK supervised component and structural modi-
ﬁcations by inspections onsite and the manufactur-
ers’ premises as well as by reviewing documents 
submitted by the licensees. Modiﬁcations oversight 
included STUK/licensee meetings and STUK inter-
nal meetings.
In consequence of the modiﬁcations implement-
ed at the plant, several documents describing plant 
operation and structure changed, like the Technical 
Speciﬁcations, the Final Safety Analysis Report 
and the operating and maintenance procedures. 
STUK reviewed the document revisions and gener-
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ally followed the updating of plant documentation 
after the modiﬁcations. The results of the follow-up 
are given in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.6).
3.2.4 Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations
Compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations of 
the Olkiluoto power plant was controlled by wit-
nessing operations onsite. The testing and repair of 
components subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations 
in particular were subject to oversight. After the 
completion of the annual maintenance outages, 
the plant unit’s compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations was ascertained before startup. The 
licensee is obliged to immediately report to STUK 
all plant situations in non-compliance with the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
Four events occurred at the Olkiluoto plant dur-
ing which the plant unit was in non-compliance 
with the Technical Speciﬁcations (Appendix 1, in-
dicator A.I.2). They were as follows
• Operator maximum working hours were ex-
ceeded
• Periodic inspection of batteries at the spent fuel 
storage was not made
• The 2-yearly testing of the radiation dose rate 
monitor of the off-gas stack of Olkiluoto 1 was 
not done in 2004 and 2006
• Dryout margin went below its smallest allow-
able value during power reduction at Olkiluo-
to 1.
The events are described in more detail in Appendix 
3, which also explains the actions planned and car-
ried out by the licensee to prevent recurrence.
The Technical Speciﬁcations were deviated from 
in a controlled manner as well, in which case 
STUK’s approval of the non-conformities was ap-
plied for in advance. The licensee applied for the 
approval of four situations in non-compliance with 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. (Appendix 1, indica-
tor A.I.2). STUK approved the applications after 
an analysis of the safety signiﬁcance of the events. 
Two exemptions pertained to deviations made from 
the Technical Speciﬁcations due to plant modiﬁca-
tions or modernisation and two to fuel and control 
rod transfers during annual maintenance.
Operation and operational events
Both Olkiluoto plant units operated reliably. The 
load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was 93.8% and that of 
Olkiluoto 2 was 96.9%. Figure 5 gives the load 
factors of the plant units in 1997−2006. The an-
nual maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1 took 21 
days and that of Olkiluoto 2 took 8 days. Outage 
progress and the measures carried out are sepa-
rately described in this chapter.
No breaks in power generation or signiﬁcant 
power losses due to component failures occurred at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2. The most signiﬁcant transients 
were due to the shutting down twice of the primary 
coolant pumps at Olkiluoto 1 and a turbine trip at 
Olkiluoto 2 due to the failure of an electronics card 
in the turbine measuring system.
Losses in nominal output from component mal-
functions were 0.33% and 0.21% at Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 respectively. Appendix 1 looks at production 
losses from component malfunctions for a longer 
period (indicator A.1.1.g). Figure 6 gives the daily 
average gross powers of the plant units.
Four events warranting a special report oc-
curred at the Olkiluoto plant units. All events 
subject to a report are addressed in Appendix 1 
(indicator A.II.1).
A special report was written on the below events 
at the Olkiluoto plant
• Operator maximum working hours were ex-
ceeded (INES Level 0)
• The time limit for the periodic inspection of bat-
teries at the spent fuel storage was exceeded 
(INES Level 0)
• The 2-yearly testing of the radiation dose rate 
monitor of the off-gas stack of Olkiluoto 1 was 
not done in 2004 and 2006 (INES Level 0)
• Dryout margin went below its smallest allowa-
ble value during power reduction at Olkiluoto 1 
(INES Level 0).
The events are described in Appendix 3.
In addition to event reports, Olkiluoto plant 
submitted to STUK daily reports, quarterly re-
ports, annual reports, outage reports, annual en-
vironmental safety reports, monthly individual ra-
diation dose reports, annual operational feedback 
reports and safeguards reports.
Figure 7 gives the number of INES Level 1 
events in 1997–2006. No events exceeding INES 




The Olkiluoto 1 refueling outage was on 7 to 30 
May and the Olkiluoto 2 maintenance outage on 
4 to 12 June. Olkiluoto 1 discontinued electricity 
generation for about 23 and Olkiluoto 2 for about 
8 days. The Olkiluoto 1 outage took about a day 
longer than planned, that of Olkiluoto 2 went al-
most according to plan.
The Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance outage was 
an extended maintenance outage during which, in 
addition to the refueling outage programme, ex-
tensive maintenance work, modiﬁcations and mod-
ernisation were carried out. The most signiﬁcant 
modiﬁcations were turbine plant upgrading, 6.6 kV 
switchgear replacements, reactor steam dryer re-
placement, containment intermediate level seal-
ing renovation and replacement of the supports 
of main steam pipes. Similar modiﬁcations were 
implemented at Olkiluoto 2 in 2005.
After the synchronisation of Olkiluoto 1, test 
runs following the turbine plant upgrading started, 
including system and plant speciﬁc testing. Where 
nuclear safety is concerned, the most signiﬁcant 
test was the scram test completing the test runs. 
After the tests, a long term test was started to 
ascertain the plant unit’s operation after the modi-
ﬁcations.
According to preliminary measurements, the 
net electrical power of Olkiluoto 1 increased by ap-
prox. 18 MW in consequence of the turbine plant 
upgrading.
In plant unit testing, during post-shutdown 
start-up, problems were detected in the movement 
of some control rods. The rods in question were 
submitted to several tests and inspections but the 
ﬁnal cause of the problem was not found. STUK 
required the testing of all control rods after the 
completion of the annual maintenance (by a scram 
test for example) and that the utility takes action 
to ensure the movement of the rods during op-
eration and that potential failure mechanisms are 
analysed during the fuel cycle. No problems have 
occurred during operation.
In inspections at Olkiluoto 2, cracks were de-
tected in a steam dryer that has been in operation 
for a year. It was replaced with an old steam dryer. 
The dryer has a weaker performance in steam sep-
aration, causing a higher steam moisture content 
and elevated radiation levels at the turbine plant.
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In addition to refueling, the utility carried 
out maintenance and inspections of components, 
structures and systems during the annual mainte-
nances, which are described in more detail later in 
the report under “Plant maintenance and ageing”. 
The safety improvements made at the plant during 
annual maintenance are described in Appendix 2.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy submitted to STUK 
applications for two exemptions from the require-
ments of the Technical Speciﬁcations for fuel and 
control rod transfers. During the transfers, the 
dose rate threshold of the radiation monitors of 
the refueling machine was exceeded and the work 
could not be continued. The effect on radiation 
safety of the changing of the threshold value was 
evaluated and, based on this, the value was reset to 
facilitate safe working.
Regulatory oversight of the annual mainte-
nance outages of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
focused, among others, on the administrative ar-
rangements of outage work, the activities of the 
operating and maintenance personnel, refueling as 
well as inspections and tests by the licensee and 
sub-contractors. Of speciﬁc interest were the trial 
runs of the Olkiluoto 2 turbine plant and switch-
gear after their modernisation, the most impor-
tant of the trial runs being the scram test. It was 
performed in accordance with a STUK-approved 
test programme. The plant operated according to 
design. Based on the approved results of the tests, 
STUK gave Teollisuuden Voima Oy permission to 
start long-term testing.
Attention was paid to the implementation of 
radiation protection, control room operations and 
housekeeping. In the annual maintenances the 
utility promoted a theme under the heading A 
Clean Process to pay attention to cleanliness and 
protection of processes from loose parts. Prior to 
the start of the new fuel cycle, safety analyses for 
the new fuel charge were reviewed. In addition, the 
loading of fuel assemblies into the reactor accord-
ing to plan was ascertained. The nuclear material 
inventory was veriﬁed prior to the closing of the 
reactor pressure vessel head. STUK controlled the 
placement of the plant units into shutdown state 
and their post-outage start-up.
The collective radiation dose incurred in outage 
work was 1.77 manSv and 0.25 manSv at Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 respectively. Occupational radiation doses 
are discussed in more detail later in the report un-
der “Radiation safety” and in Appendix 1 (indicator 
A.I.4).
The regulatory oversight of Olkiluoto facility’s 
annual maintenance outages onsite took 133 work-
ing days. Two resident inspectors were regularly 
working at the site. In addition, a total of 126 in-
spection days outside normal working hours were 
spent in outage oversight.
Plant maintenance and ageing
STUK assesses the lifetime management pro-
gramme of the Olkiluoto plants by technical ﬁeld 
speciﬁc inspections of the operational inspection 
programme and during annual maintenance over-
sight.
In an inspection of the maintenance of mechani-
cal components STUK evaluated the monitoring 
and inspection of fatigue and erosion corrosion 
caused by pressure and temperature transients as 
well as inspection results over the past years, and 
also operating experiences from the auxiliary feed 
water system. STUK required that the utility in-
vestigates in a pilot project during a periodic safety 
assessment how the corrosiveness of an operating 
environment potentially speeds up the fatigue phe-
nomenon. In the inspection, several items surfaced 
where, by change of methods, stress to structures 
important to safety can be avoided.
In an inspection of the maintenance of mechani-
cal components, STUK evaluated the power plant’s 
maintenance instructions, particularly their suit-
ability for use by personnel externally contracted 
for annual maintenances and user training. STUK 
also required that the utility complements its in-
structions on Safety Class 2 pumps.
Every year the utility reports on the ageing of 
electrical and I&C components. The most signiﬁ-
cant ageing phenomena, observations about ageing 
and actions necessary for lifetime extension are 
described. The observations mostly relate to the 
ageing of the structural parts of components. Other 
previously detected ageing phenomena under mon-
itoring are whisker growth on zinc coated surfaces 
and wear of the sliding surfaces of position indica-
tors, among others. As a result of an inspection 
of electrical and I&C components included in the 
periodic inspection programme, STUK required 
that the utility develops maintenance programmes 
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for medium and low voltage switchgear and the 
condition monitoring of containment cabling and 
also investigates the design bases and qualiﬁca-
tion procedures of accident resistant cables inside 
the containment and their performance in case of 
need.
Condition monitoring programmes are in place 
for monitoring the condition of the buildings of 
Olkiluoto power plant. The following were meas-
ured, among others: containment strain, deforma-
tion of the expansion joint between the contain-
ment building and the reactor building and of the 
containment building intermediate level, tempera-
ture and moisture of containment building con-
crete structures; visual inspections of containment 
internal concrete structures and coatings were 
made and cracks in concrete structures were moni-
tored. Based on the inspections and investigations, 
STUK assessed the condition of the structures of 
Olkiluoto power plant as good.
No signiﬁcant ageing management related ob-
servations were made in the annual maintenances 
of the Olkiluoto plant units. In-service inspection of 
the reactor pressure vessel and piping, which is the 
duty of the licensee, was carried out at both plant 
units in accordance with Guide YVL 3.8. STUK 
approved the inspection programmes prior to the 
start of inspection and oversaw the inspections and 
their results onsite. The observations made dur-
ing inspection included, among others, indications 
found in the welded seams between the assem-
blies of the reactor spray system and their safe-
ends. VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
analysed the indications and STUK approved that 
they are monitored, not repaired. The ﬁnal result 
reports of inspections in accordance with Guide 
YVL 3.8 will be submitted to STUK for approval 
after the annual maintenance. The results of the 
condition monitoring inspections of secondary pip-
ing made by the licensee were reviewed by STUK 
onsite.
Olkiluoto 1 underwent an extended outage dur-
ing which steam reheaters and a high pressure 
turbine as well as the steam dryer inside the reac-
tor pressure vessel were replaced. Similar work 
was done at Olkiluoto 2 in 2005. Cracks in the lugs 
of feedwater distributors were repaired during the 
annual maintenance based on experiences gained 
in the 2005 outage. STUK expects the utility to 
monitor the condition of the distributors in forth-
coming outages. Other work included, among oth-
ers, the replacement of an inner isolation valve of 
the shutdown reactor coolant system.
A steam dryer installed in 2005 was inspected 
in a brief Olkiluoto 2 annual outage. Cracks were 
detected in the welds of the ﬂat bar irons of its 
outermost array of sheets. The dryer was removed 
from the reactor and replaced by an old dryer. The 
new dryer is intended to be repaired during the 
operating cycle and reinstalled into the reactor in 
the 2007 outage.
During the annual maintenance outage, repairs 
and improvements pertaining to ageing manage-
ment were carried out at the Olkiluoto plants. A 
minor leak of the steel lining of the condensation 
pool, which has taken place at Olkiluoto 1 for sev-
eral years, was located and repaired. The joint be-
tween the containment building intermediate level 
and the cylinder wall was reinforced to withstand 
severe accident conditions. In addition, The sealing 
of the expansion joint of the transportation shaft 
was replaced. The utility improved the corrosion 
protection of steels in the concrete structures of sea 
water tunnels.
The repairs and maintenance of electrical and 
I&C systems and components included, among 
others, replacement of the rotor and exciter of the 
Olkiluoto 1 main generator and upgrading of the 
6.6 kV medium voltage switchgear. One safety-
classiﬁed battery and ﬁve valve actuators were 
replaced at Olkiluoto 1. At Olkiluoto 2, one origi-
nal starting transformer and one safety classiﬁed 
battery were replaced. At both plant units, relays 
subject to heaviest loading and important to opera-
bility were replaced due to the ageing of their comb 
material. A rectiﬁer replacement project began at 
Olkiluoto 2 in the autumn of 2006.
STUK made seven periodic inspections of Safety 
Class 1 and 2 items of pressure equipment and 12 
commissioning inspections of a new item of pres-
sure equipment at Olkiluoto 1. Six commissioning 
inspections were made at Olkiluoto 2.
STUK made 209 construction inspections and 
inspections of repairs and modiﬁcations. Most of 
them were made during outages.
The Teollisuuden Voima Oy inspection organi-
sation made 43 commissioning inspections of safe-
ty classiﬁed items in electrical and I&C systems. 
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STUK reviewed their pre-inspection documents 
and witnessed some of the commissioning inspec-
tions. During the annual maintenances, STUK 
oversaw the periodic inspections and testing of 
electrical and I&C systems.
Radiation safety
Occupational radiation safety
The ALARA action programme to reduce occupa-
tional radiation dose was updated at the Olkiluoto 
plant. The high moisture content of turbine steam 
has affected radiation protection. A major decision 
to reduce the steam moisture content was made at 
Olkiluoto in 2005 and 2006. Old steam dryer was 
reinstalled at Olkiluoto 2 so that the defects de-
tected in the new dryer, which had been in opera-
tion for a year, can be repaired.
An essential part of the collective occupational 
dose incurred at nuclear power plants accumu-
lates during annual maintenances, in which case 
practical work is, to a substantial degree, done 
by contractors external to the plant. Doses have 
been reduced by developing work procedures and 
work order. In order to limit radiation levels at the 
plants, components have been replaced with com-
ponents having cobalt-free coatings.
The results of radiation protection at the plants 
in 2005 and 2006 were good considering the exact-
ing nature of the work done; work requiring special 
attention was implemented according to plans. In 
a comparison carried out by the OECD/NEA, the 
collective occupational dose at the Olkiluoto plants 
was among the best for BWRs, with the exception 
of the last two years during which a very extensive 
turbine modiﬁcation was carried out at the plant 
units.
A summary of occupational radiation exposure 
at the Finnish nuclear power plants is given in the 
section about the Loviisa plant.
The highest individual occupational dose at 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was 12.2 mSv. The 
collective occupational dose was 1.88 manSv at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 0.33 manSv at Olkiluoto 2, total-
ling 2.20 manSv. Olkiluoto 1 underwent an excep-
tionally extensive annual maintenance outage as 
regards the amount of work done. With the present 
plant unit output (860 MW), the threshold, in ac-
cordance with STUK guidelines, for one Olkiluoto 
plant unit’s collective dose averaged over two suc-
cessive years is 2.15 manSv for Olkiluoto 1 and 2. 
With the radiation doses incurred in 2005-2006 
this was not exceeded in either plant unit. The col-
lective occupational radiation doses incurred over 
the past years are given in Appendix 1 (indicator 
A.I.4).
Radioactive releases
Annual thresholds for radioactive releases to the 
environment are determined in a plant’s Technical 
Speciﬁcations. Radioactive releases to the environ-
ment from Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were well 
below authorised limits. The releases of noble gas-
es to the atmosphere were approx. 0.6 TBq, i.e. ap-
prox. 0.004% of the set limit. Iodine releases were 
approx. 0.2 GBq, i.e. approx. 0.1% of the set limit. 
Aerosol releases were approx. 31 MBq, tritium 
releases approx. 0.3 TBq and carbon-14 releases 
approx. 0.8 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid efﬂuents released 
into the sea, 2.5 TBq, is approx. 14% of the annual 
release limit. The total activity of nuclides released 
into the sea was 0.7 GBq, i.e. approx. 0.2% of the 
plant-site speciﬁc release limit.
The release limits are intended to maintain the 
annual individual radiation exposure of the popu-
lation surrounding the plants clearly below the 
threshold value (100 microSv) determined by the 
Government Decision (395/1991). The calculated 
radiation dose of the most exposed individual in 
the environment of the Olkiluoto plant was ap-
prox 0.06 microSv, i.e. less than 0.1% of the limit 
prescribed by Government Decision (100 microSv). 
Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.5) presents radioactive 
releases and the radiation doses calculated for the 
most exposed individual in the plant’s environment 
over the past years.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Environmental radiation monitoring around a nu-
clear power plant comprises on- and off-site ra-
diation measurements as well as determination of 
radioactive substances to establish public exposure 
and radioactive substances in the environment.
In the environment of Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant, 301 samples were analysed. Radioactive 
substances originating in the plant were measured 
in nine samples of aquatic plants, 11 samples of 
sinking matter, three samples of air, one sample of 
bottom fauna and one sample of sea water.
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Cobalt-60, the dominating radioactive substance 
originating in power plants, was measured in 23 
samples. Manganese-54 (5 observations), tritium (1 
observation), cobalt-58 (1 observation) and stron-
tium-89 (1 observation) were measured as well.
All the detected concentrations were low and 
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
The external radiation dose rate is continu-
ously monitored by 10 automatic stations at the 
distance of ﬁve kilometres from the plants and by 
four corresponding measuring stations at about a 
kilometre from the plants. The measurement data 
are transferred to the power plant and the national 
radiation-monitoring system. In addition, there are 
11 passive dosimeters around the plant, which are 
separately read. No changes occurred in external 
radiation that would have exceeded ﬂuctuations in 
natural background radiation.
3.2.5 Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
Based on information accumulated during docu-
ment review and other inspection activity at the 
Olkiluoto plant, STUK assesses how the utility at-
tends to plant safety.
The construction of the new plant unit requires 
a considerable amount of work and learning of 
new skills of the technical experts of operating 
plants. In an inspection of the periodic inspection 
programme made by STUK, development needs 
surfaced in the plant’s human resources planning 
and recruitment practices. STUK will follow the 
development of these practices in 2007.
Quality management system
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has systematically main-
tained and developed its quality management 
system according to own plans. The licensee has 
regularly evaluated the functionality of its quality 
management system by an internal follow-up pro-
gramme. An assessment of the utility’s activities 
during annual maintenance and operation by The 
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) 
looked at the quality management system as well. 
Development needs have surfaced and improve-
ments will be implemented over the next years. 
The report proper is due for completion in 2007.
STUK oversaw quality management and its 
functionality by document reviews and inspections 
of its periodic inspection programme. The quality 
management system of the licensee was found ac-
ceptable. The operation of Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
was found to be in compliance with the plant’s own 
quality management system. The remarks made 
during the inspections were mostly about further 
development of the system and deﬁnition of detail. 
In the quality assurance inspection, a remark was 
made on the evaluation of the functionality and 
scope of quality assurance. Evaluation is to be 
developed such that, in the evaluation reports, not 
only recommendations are given but also an as-
sessment, in accordance with Guide YVL 1.9, of the 
condition of the quality management system.
Personnel qualiﬁcations and training
STUK oversaw personnel training at Olkiluoto 
power plant within the framework of the periodic 
inspection programme. A challenge in the enhanc-
ing of expertise at the Olkiluoto plant was prepar-
ing for the operation of Olkiluoto 3. The training 
of new operators was important as well. Training 
procedures and their functionality need to be fur-
ther developed to ensure operator competence. A 5-
week basic professional training course on nuclear 
safety in Finland was attended by 17 persons from 
the Olkiluoto plant.
Upon licensee application, STUK authorised its 
employees to act as shift managers or operators 
at the nuclear power plant. A total of 32 Olkiluoto 
personnel were authorised, of which two are new 
shift managers, seven are new operators and nine 
operator trainees. The other decisions of approval 
were periodic revisions of old decisions.
Operational experience feedback
STUK oversaw operational feedback activities by 
reviewing event reports and the annual operation-
al experience feedback report submitted by the 
licensee. The Olkiluoto plant has systematic pro-
cedures for event investigation, assessment and 
corrective action.
The licensee’s operational experience feedback 
consisted of the review of events at own and other 
plants. Events at plants abroad were discussed in 
a special operational feedback working group with 
the aim of developing and improving operations 
and preventing recurrence of events compromis-
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ing plant safety. Operational experience feedback 
information was disseminated to the personnel in 
the form of reports and training.
STUK met with Teollisuuden Voima Oy in 
January to discuss recurring events recorded in op-
erational experience feedback. Plant conditions in 
non-compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations 
still occurred at the Olkiluoto plant. Underlying 
the events are recurring deﬁciencies in the admin-
istration of periodic testing and the identiﬁcation 
of the requirements of the Technical Speciﬁcations. 
Corrective action to remedy the situation has been 
insufﬁcient so far.
An IRS team that follows operational experi-
ence feedback at foreign nuclear power plants op-
erates at STUK. Event data was obtained through 
the IAEA and the OECD’s Incident Reporting 
System (IRS). STUK evaluates the applicability of 
the lessons learned thereof at Finnish plants.
Due to a disturbance in the electrical power sys-
tems at Forsmark nuclear power plant in Sweden, 
the probability of a similar event at the Olkiluoto 
plant was assessed. The Forsmark event is de-
scribed in Appendix 4.
Event investigation
STUK started no event investigations on Olkiluoto 
1 or 2. An event investigation team is set up when-
ever the licensee’s organisation has not functioned 
as planned in connection with an event or when an 
event is assessed to lead to signiﬁcant modiﬁca-
tions in the plant technical layout or procedures. 
A STUK investigation team is set up also in case 
the licensee has not sufﬁciently analysed the root 
causes of an event.
Pressure equipment manufacturers, and 
inspection and testing organisations
Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, and 
in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK 
authorised 25 manufacturers of nuclear pressure 
equipment.
In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK authorised 26 testing organisations to con-
duct nondestructive testing relating to the manu-
facturing of mechanical components and structures 
for the Olkiluoto plant units. Testers employed 
by four separate testing organisations were au-
thorised to carry out the in-service inspection 
of mechanical components and structures of the 
Olkiluoto plant units. Previous decisions pertain-
ing to manufacturers and testing organisations are 
valid as mentioned in the decisions.
The inspection unit of the Olkiluoto plant, 
“Teollisuuden Voima Oy inspection organisation”, 
authorised in 2002, continued in operation as well 
as two other inspection organisations approved in 
2005.
STUK oversaw at both plant units the inspec-
tions of Safety Class 3 and 4 as well as Class 
EYT (non-nuclear) pressure equipment carried out 
by the inspection organisations. STUK controlled 
also the inspection of mechanical components in 
Safety Classes 3 and 4 and Class EYT (non-nu-
clear) by the utility’s own inspection unit. Safety 
Classiﬁcation is based on STUK’s Guide YVL 2.1, 
according to which components are assigned to the 
Safety Classes 1, 2, 3 and 4 as well as Class EYT 
(non-nuclear). Items with the highest safety sig-
niﬁcance belong to Safety Class 1.
The manufacturers as well as testing and in-
spection organisations authorised by STUK were 
subject to regulatory oversight by inspections, re-
view of documents and audits. Their operation was 
established to comply with the requirements of 
Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3
STUK oversaw the operation of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy’s inspection unit “Teollisuuden Voima Oy, 
Inspection, electrical and I&C inspection”, author-
ised by STUK, and the electrotechnical and I&C 
commissioning inspections made by its inspectors. 
These were found to be in compliance with Guide 
YVL 5.2.
Nuclear liability
The users of nuclear energy must have acquired 
liability, or other ﬁnancial guarantee, as stipulat-
ed in the Nuclear Liability Act (484/1972) for a 
possible accident at a nuclear facility that would 
harm the environment, population and property. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has prepared for damage 
from a nuclear accident as prescribed by law by 
taking out an insurance policy for this purpose 
mainly in the Finnish Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In the case of an accident, the funds available 
for compensation come from three sources: the li-
censee, the country of location of the facility and the 
international liability community. About €425 mil-
lion was available for compensation from all these 
sources. An increase in the sum is expected in the 
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near future since international negotiations about 
the revision of the Paris/Brussels agreements on 
nuclear liability were completed in 2004. The funds 
available for compensation will more than triple 
in the coming years compared with the current 
situation. In addition, Finland has decided to enact 
unlimited licensee liability by law. The amendment 
has not taken effect yet but is pending the coming 
into force of the aforementioned agreements.
The revision of the contents and conditions of 
a licensee’s insurance policy in Finland belongs 
to the Insurance Supervisory Authority. It has 
approved Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insur-
ance and STUK has veriﬁed the existence of the 
policy in accordance with section 55 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987).
The transport of nuclear materials is subject to 
the Nuclear Liability Act. STUK has seen to it that 
all nuclear material transport has had liability 
insurance in accordance with the Paris Convention 
and approved by the Insurance Supervisory 
Authority or the authorities of the sending coun-
try
3.2.6 Safety performance indicators
The requirements set for the safety indicators of 
the effectiveness of STUK’s operations were ful-
ﬁlled at Olkiluoto power plant in all the areas 
where they had been established: occupational ra-
diation doses, radioactive releases from nuclear fa-
cilities and the population exposure arising from 
them, safety-compromising events at nuclear facili-
ties and the condition of components contributing 
to accident risk at nuclear facilities.
Individual and collective occupational doses 
at the nuclear power plant were below set lim-
its. The collective occupational radiation dose for 
Olkiluoto power plant in 2005-2006 was higher 
than in the preceding years. This was due to the 
annual maintenance outages that were of excep-
tional scope as regards human resources and work 
load. Radioactive aerosol and liquid releases as 
well as the radiation exposure caused by them to 
the surrounding population remained small and 
below set limits. Iodine and aerosol releases from 
the Olkiluoto plant grew slightly owing to fuel 
leaks at both units.
The safety performance indicators showed no 
signiﬁcant deﬁciencies in the plant’s operation. 
The plant units were mostly operated in accord-
ance with the Technical Speciﬁcations, with the 
exception of four deviations: operator maximum 
working hours were exceeded, the time limit for 
the periodic inspection of batteries at the spent 
fuel storage was exceeded, the 2-yearly testing of 
the radiation dose rate monitor of the off-gas stack 
of Olkiluoto 1 was not done in 2004 and 2006 and 
the dryout margin went below its smallest allow-
able value during a power reduction at Olkiluoto 1. 
These non-conformities were the only events war-
ranting a special report. The number of events at 
the Olkiluoto plant of which a special report is 
written has not changed compared with the previ-
ous years. Four operational events occurred whose 
direct cause in most cases was a technical failure, 
not human error. A wastepaper basket caught ﬁre 
during the Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance, and 
this was classiﬁed as an actual ﬁre event.
The safety performance indicator system for 
nuclear power plants looks also at the risk-impor-
tance of operational events. Based on their risk-im-
portance, events are divided into three categories, 
the indicator being the number of events in each 
category. The number of risk-signiﬁcant events at 
Olkiluoto, in comparison to 2005, was unchanged. 
The most signiﬁcant events were due to diesel 
generator preventive maintenance packages and 
latent failures in the auxiliary feedwater systems. 
The number of other risk-signiﬁcant events at 
Olkiluoto was approximately the same as in 2005. 
Unavailabilities at the plant were caused, as be-
fore, by planned component unavailabilities. The 
events were quite evenly distributed between the 
plant units. The events analysed are part of a nu-
clear power plant’s normal operation and required 
no further action by STUK.
The safety indicators of the effectiveness of 
STUK’s operations include, among others, the fol-
lowing objective important for the condition of 
components signiﬁcant to accident risk: accident 
risk at nuclear power plants is reduced or remains 
unchanged. Risk is assessed by Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis in which the model includes i.a. regularly 
updated component reliability data. Accident risk 
at the Olkiluoto plant was reduced to some extent 
from 2005 due to certain plant modiﬁcations and 
more detailed analyses.
The trend in the maintenance function at the 
Olkiluoto plant was difﬁcult to assess. The vol-
ume of maintenance annually done on components 
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subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations was not 
directly comparable to that of previous years since 
the recording procedures on which the indicator is 
based have changed. Despite the changes, the pre-
ventive maintenance/fault repair ratio remained 
at the average level of previous years. Based on 
this, the maintenance function is assessed to be 
in balance and implemented on the same bases as 
before. Preventive maintenance work, dictated by 
the length of annual maintenance outages, affects 
the volume of preventive maintenance done at the 
plants. Changes in the indicators should in future 
mainly reﬂect the changing order of annual main-
tenances, which could be considered an indication 
of a functioning maintenance strategy.
The mild upward trend in the total for fault 
repairs of components subject to the Technical 
Speciﬁcations during power operation stopped. 
Fault detection and anticipation have been con-
tinuously improved and components replaced in 
the plants’ maintenance function. Owing to this, 
the possible negative effect of ageing on the plants 
is not visible in the indicator or the fault data on 
which it is based. This indicates functioning com-
ponent lifetime management and successful com-
ponent maintenance.
The average repair times of failures causing un-
availability of components subject to the Technical 
Speciﬁcations have remained moderately stable at 
the Olkiluoto plant units for years. They became 
shorter at both plant units. Production losses due 
to malfunctions in all systems were small, which is 
also indicated by the plants’ high load factors.
International indexes measuring safety sys-
tems unavailability showed that the inoperabilities 
of monitored systems are at a low level, which is to 
be considered normal. There were less containment 
spray system and back-up diesel generator una-
vailabilities and the condition of diesel generators 
was good. The unavailability index of the auxiliary 
feedwater system slightly increased at Olkiluoto 1 
due to the system’s malfunctioning recirculation 
and safety valves. As corrective action, the torque 
values of the actuator motors of the valves in the 
recirculation line have been changed and the con-
struction of a separate testing line for the safety 
valves has been preliminarily discussed.
The indicator for maintenance and modiﬁcation 
investments at the plant showed that investments 
have remained at a level above average. Major 
investments at the Olkiluoto plant over the past 
years include a turbine plant upgrading, which 
includes replacement of steam dryers. In addition, 
the construction of a gas turbine plant, started in 
2005, was continued. By plant start-up, the plant 
documentation had been quite well updated after 
the modiﬁcations made during the annual main-
tenances.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing radioactive releases has been mostly 
good. Fuel leaks have recently occurred every year 
at the Olkiluoto plant units. In 2006, the Olkiluoto 
1 reactor contained leaking fuel for a short period 
prior to the annual maintenance outage. Olkiluoto 
2 contained leaking fuel for the entire burn-up 
period 2005–2006 and a new leak occurred right 
after the annual maintenance outage. The leaks’ 
effects are an increased iodine-131 concentration of 
reactor water during operation as well as increased 
iodine and aerosol releases.
The chemistry indexes showed a successfully 
maintained chemistry. The reactor water and feed-
water chemistry have been in accordance with the 
target values set by the utility, with the exception 
of the sulphite concentrations of reactor water 
showing variability due to the runtimes of conden-
sate clean-up ﬁlter masses, and the above-average 
high temperature of the condensate in the summer. 
The cobalt-60 concentration of reactor water has 
been on the increase at Olkiluoto 2. Along with 
replacement parts or components installed during 
extensive modiﬁcations in 2005, materials contain-
ing cobalt have entered the circuit. The spacer grid 
material of a certain fuel type has added to the 
increase in concentrations.
Primary circuit leaks are monitored by operat-
ing cycle. During the 2005–2006 operating cycle, 
the volumes of identiﬁed and unidentiﬁed leaks 
from the primary circuit were low at both Olkiluoto 
plant units. This is a third successive operating 
cycle with no primary leaks to the containment 
airspace.
The leaktightness of containment buildings has 
remained good. At Olkiluoto 1, the sum of the 
leaktightness tests of outermost isolation valves 
after the ﬁrst leaktightness tests was small, like 
in the previous years. At Olkiluoto 2, the sum 
clearly increased as compared to 2005, exceeding 
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the limit set in the Technical Speciﬁcations. Half 
of the leak came from a leaking valve in the con-
trolled leak collection system and almost twenty 
percent from a leaking valve in the spray system of 
the reactor pressure vessel head. After the repairs, 
combined leak rate is clearly below the limit set in 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. The share of isolation 
valves passing the leaktightness test at ﬁrst try 
has remained good and improvement from 2005 
is apparent at the Olkiluoto plants. The combined 
leak rate of openings at the Olkiluoto plant has 
remained small.
The outcome of STUK indicators for plant safe-
ty are given in Appendix 1.
3.2.7 Overall safety assessment
The operation of Olkiluoto power plant has been 
free from disturbances, with the exception of a 
couple of deviations. STUK did not detect any sig-
niﬁcant defects affecting safety. Individual and col-
lective occupational doses at the plant as well as 
the dose calculated to the most exposed individual 
in the environment of the plant were in accord-
ance with set objectives. The collective occupa-
tional dose was high by international comparison 
due to the turbine plant upgrading at Olkiluoto 1. 
Occupational doses can be reduced by returning 
the new steam dryer back to service after repairs. 
In addition, the plant is to ﬁnd out how to further 
reduce occupational doses.
Actions to prevent initiating events at Olkiluoto 
power plant have worked well. The effects of age-
ing, among others, were not visible in the safety in-
dicators for maintenance. Upgrading of the plant’s 
electrical and I&C systems has improved the reli-
ability of its protective functions.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing radioactive releases has been good al-
though fuel leaktightness has presented problems 
every year. The loose parts campaign, launched 
at the Olkiluoto plant in the 2006 annual main-
tenance outage, has not yet yielded the desired 
results. Plant modiﬁcations implemented in the 
annual maintenance outage have helped ascertain 
the leaktightness of the coolant circuit and the 
containment.
The plant’s ageing management process very 
systematically ascertains the implementation of 
system and component modiﬁcations. In this proc-
ess, the avoidance of component loadings is to be 
better considered than before. The qualiﬁcation of 
cabling important to safety is to be veriﬁed better 
than before.
Olkiluoto power plant has in place the proce-
dures and human resources to safely operate the 
plant. Several items in this ﬁeld require further 
enhancement. The use of external assessment is a 
good practice but does not reduce the signiﬁcance 
of, and the requirements for, self-assessment. The 
training of new operators is a signiﬁcant challenge 
for the plant unit under construction and those in 
operation. The training procedures and their func-
tionality need to be further developed to maintain 
good operator competence. Conditions in non-con-
formity with the Technical Speciﬁcations have still 
occurred at the plant. It has not been possible to 
sufﬁciently well eliminate the causes underlying 
them.
3.3 Olkiluoto 3
Main emphasis in the oversight of Olkiluoto 3 was 
in the review of detailed design documents and 
the manufacturing of main components. The share 
of onsite operations in oversight was less than 
planned because construction work progressed 
slower than planned. Prerequisites for the opera-
tion of organisations were oversawn by inspection 
and audits. In addition, STUK performed an in-
vestigation based on problems in organisations’ 
operation, which surfaced during the concreting of 
the plant’s base slab. Included in the investigation 
were deﬁciencies that surfaced during the manu-
facturing of the containment steel liner, the design-
ing of the reactor building polar crane and of the 
material lock. The investigation and its outcome 
are reported in more detail in subsection 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Implementation of regulations
The presentation of new requirements in updated 
YVL guides does not, as such, alter any previous 
decisions made by STUK. After having heard those 
concerned, STUK makes a separate decision on 
how a new or revised YVL guide applies to operat-
ing nuclear power plants, or those under construc-
tion, and to licensees’ operational activities. This 
procedure applies to Olkiluoto 3 in the enforcement 
of YVL guides published after 17 February 2005, 
i.e. the granting date of the construction licence.
38
STUK-B 79
When considering how new safety requirements 
presented in YVL guides apply to operating nu-
clear power plants, or to those under construc-
tion, STUK takes into account section 27 of the 
Government Decision (395/1991), which prescribes 
that for further safety enhancement, action shall 
be taken which can be regarded as justiﬁed con-
sidering operating experience and the results of 
safety research as well as the advancement of sci-
ence and technology.
As regards Olkiluoto 3, which is under construc-
tion, brought into force as such were the following 
revised YVL guides:
• YVL 2.4, Primary and secondary circuit pres-
sure control at a nuclear power plant, 24 No-
vember 2006
• YVL 3.1, Nuclear facility pressure vessels, 31 
January 2006
• YVL 8.3, Treatment and storage of low and in-
termediate level waste at a nuclear power plant, 
29 July 2005.
• In addition, STUK made the below additional 
decision pertaining to Olkiluoto 3, as regards 
a YVL guide issued before the granting of the 
construction licence:
• YVL 3.8, Nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment. Inservice inspection with non-destructive 
testing methods,10 February 2.2006
In the decision STUK requires that the utility sub-
mits the inservice inspection summary programme 
to STUK during construction already.
3.3.2 Assessment of safety analyses
Transient and accident analyses
Teollisuuden Voima Oy did not submit to STUK 
for review accident and transient analyses of the 
behaviour of Olkiluoto 3. Commissioned by STUK, 
VTT State Technical Research Centre in Finland 
continued to develop models for analysis of plant 
behaviour to correspond to plant detailed design. 
STUK thus prepares for the review of analyses 
during the operating licence phase. To assist in the 
review of detailed design, STUK commissioned in-
dependent assessments and analyses of hydrogen 
management during severe accidents and of a po-
tential recriticality risk during a steam generator 
heat exchanger tube break.
Fire and ﬂood analyses
The utility submitted to STUK for review updated 
ﬁre analyses for the containment, the annulus and 
cable ducts as well as the turbine building plus 
ﬂood analyses for the containment and the annu-
lus, the diesel building and the auxiliary service 
water pump units. The review of ﬁre and ﬂood 
analyses will continue in 2007. In support of the 
review, STUK commissioned to VTT independent 
ﬁre safety analyses of ﬁre retardant non-corrosive 
cables.
Buildings analyses
STUK reviewed a non-linear 3-D model for the 
containment and analyses for vibrations in the 
containment, the fuel building and the safeguard 
buildings generated by aircraft impacts. STUK re-
viewed the design for adequate strength and stress 
analyses for the aircraft impact walls, etc. struc-
tures, of these buildings.
Probabilistic Safety Analysis
In 2005 STUK reviewed the Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis (PSA) for Olkiluoto 3. Despite its defects, 
STUK found the analysis and its general design 
bases adequate. The then detailed plant design 
was incomplete in many respects. STUK in 2006 
assessed how the design bases had been imple-
mented in the detailed design documents of sys-
tems and structures. The objective was to ensure 
adequacy of design, particularly as regards local 
events (e.g. ﬁres and ﬂooding onsite) and external 
events, and to identify interdependencies between 
systems and possible tendencies for common cause 
failures.
The Probabilistic Safety Analysis and its com-
puter model were not submitted to STUK for 
review in 2006. An unofﬁcial PSA model update 
was submitted to STUK for information in which 
STUK’s earlier comments were taken into account 
in part. A project plan for the preparation and ap-
plication of the analysis and its update as well as a 
plan for a seismic PSA were submitted to STUK for 
review. Of the applications of the PSA, STUK re-
viewed method descriptions for the choice of items 
in the piping periodic inspection programme and 
for the drawing up of Technical Speciﬁcations.
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3.3.3 Oversight of plant project
Conceptual design planning
Of the conceptual design planning documents of 
Olkiluoto 3, the utility submitted to STUK for 
review the general design objectives to provide 
against internal and external threats, among oth-
ers. The documents included separation princi-
ples for minimising the consequences of internal 
threats, like ﬂooding and ﬁre, between divisions. 
The review brought forth matters that the utility 
and the vendor are to take into account in future 
planning. They mostly relate to a more unambigu-
ous documentation of the design criteria. The re-
view of conceptual design planning will continue 
in 2007.
STUK continued to review the layout of the 
buildings, structures and components of Olkiluoto 3 
using a 3D-model of the plant. Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy updated the model as planning progressed.
The utility submitted to STUK for review docu-
ments describing the structure of the Technical 
Speciﬁcations essential for the operational safety 
of Olkiluoto 3. The remarks made by STUK dealt 
with improvement of the usability and clarity of 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. The utility and STUK 
began discussions of how to ensure the safety of 
actions taken during the plant’s annual mainte-
nances.
Radiation safety
STUK reviewed the technical and functional re-
quirement speciﬁcations of the radiation meas-
urement systems of Olkiluoto 3 and their quality 
plans. STUK required the enhancing of the seis-
mic endurance of certain measurement systems 
and the ascertaining of power supply to release 
sampling to ensure its availability during severe 
accidents and other design-basis accidents. STUK 
reviewed a plan to renew the radiation monitoring 
system in the environment of the plant site.
Commissioned by STUK, VTT Technical 
Research Centre in Finland, launched independent 
reference analyses to analyse the severe accident 
source term. The utility and STUK began discus-
sions about the detailed planning of an automated 
data transfer system for use at Olkiluoto 3 during 
emergency response situations.
As part of their pre-inspection, STUK reviews 
systems’ radiation safety requirements.
Ageing management
The basis for the ageing management of main com-
ponents and other safety-signiﬁcant mechanical 
equipment is that their materials and manufac-
turing techniques are to be technologically second 
to none in all ﬁelds. STUK paid attention to the 
matter during review of the structural plans of 
the main components and during control of man-
ufacturing. Of speciﬁc interest was the safe-end 
weld between the reactor coolant lines and the 
reactor pressure vessel. The welding ﬁller mate-
rial and technique used are new and no operat-
ing experience exists. STUK called for a follow-up 
programme to monitor weld characteristics during 
manufacturing and plant operation.
Regular inspections of the inservice inspection 
programme pertaining to the commissioning of me-
chanical components at Olkiluoto 3 are to be made 
using methods qualiﬁed in accordance with Guide 
YVL 3.8. The vendor and Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
have launched qualiﬁcation of the inspection meth-
ods and STUK has reviewed the ﬁrst documents 
pertaining to qualiﬁcation. STUK required from 
the utility an inservice inspection summary pro-
gramme in accordance with Guide YVL 3.8. It will 
be submitted to STUK in 2007.
No signiﬁcant review of documents on electrical 
and I&C components was begun in 2006. Ageing 
-related matters will be presented in component 
feasibility studies to be submitted to STUK. During 
the review of the Preliminary Safety Analysis 
Report STUK required that a preliminary ageing 
follow-up programme is to be drawn up for electri-
cal and I&C components during the construction of 
the plant unit.
Systems planning
STUK continued to review the detailed plans for 
process systems. The approval of plans for systems 
most important to nuclear safety was mainly com-
pleted. The conditions of approval included detailed 
requirements for future planning. The review of 
I&C and electrical planning for process systems 
will continue in 2007.
STUK reviewed plans for the electrical power 
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supply systems of the reactor plant and the turbine 
plant as well as for systems relating to secured 
electrical power supply. In addition, the following 
were inspected, among others: consumer lists, fre-
quency and voltage limits to be observed in process 
planning, the generator and its auxiliary systems, 
failure analyses of programmable electrical compo-
nents, and cabling isolation requirements to ensure 
ﬁre safety at the plant.
The utility submitted the technical and func-
tional requirement speciﬁcations of the main I&C 
systems as well as their quality plans and systems 
descriptions to STUK for review. STUK reviewed 
the design criteria for the electrical isolation of the 
main I&C systems, how the diversity principle has 
been observed in the measurement of process pa-
rameters, and evaluated software planning and the 
life cycle of I&C systems planning. In addition to 
the main I&C systems, STUK reviewed individual 
I&C systems, such as those of the containment con-
dition monitoring system, the seismicity monitor-
ing system and the fuel handling system.
STUK began review of control room and simu-
lator documents. Control room quality plan and 
its design veriﬁcation and validation plans were 
reviewed by STUK.
Component and structural design
The review of detailed component design focused 
on the construction and manufacturing plans of 
the main components (the reactor pressure ves-
sel and steam generators with their internals, the 
pressuriser, the reactor coolant pumps, the reactor 
coolant lines and the control rod drive mechanisms. 
Attention was particularly focused on the safe-end 
weld between the reactor coolant line and the reac-
tor pressure vessel as well as on the availability of 
a suitable testing method for the reactor coolant 
line material. STUK and the inspection organisa-
tions authorised by it continued to review the con-
struction plans of other mechanical components. 
STUK reviewed plans for the refuelling machine 
and other fuel handling equipment, among others.
The review of electrical equipment began with 
the review of the construction plans of pump mo-
tors in the intermediate coolant circuit. STUK 
made numerous remarks on the contents of the 
construction plan. Due to the work arising from 
this, the utility postponed the submission to STUK 
of other construction plans. In addition, the quali-
ﬁcation of software for a multifunctional protective 
relay and the project speciﬁcations of batteries, rec-
tiﬁers and cabling were reviewed. STUK required 
an analysis of the reliability of programmable com-
ponents. As a result, the utility ended up present-
ing various types of programmable equipment for 
different voltage levels.
The handling of fuel licensing documents began 
with a review of fuel operational and behavioural 
analyses, fuel fabrication quality plans and docu-
ments as well as fuel design plans. STUK required 
from the utility further analyses (i.a. a fuel fea-
sibility study) to complement the fuel design and 
fabrication documents.
Manufacturing and construction
Regulatory oversight in component manufac-
turing focused on the inspection of main compo-
nents. STUK’s inspectors supervised by regular 
monthly visits the manufacturing of the reactor 
pressure vessel at the factory of Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries in Japan and of steam generators at the 
factory of Chalon in France. During the visits, the 
manufacturing of other components, such as the 
pressuriser, primary coolant piping and the pri-
mary coolant pumps was supervised. At the factory 
of Skoda in the Czech Republic, the manufacturing 
of reactor pressure vessel internals was supervised 
and in Poland the manufacturing of the steel liner 
that ensures the leaktightness of the containment. 
STUK thus aims to ensure adequate manufacturer, 
vendor and utility supervision and compliance of 
products with the requirements.
Construction oversight focused on the manufac-
turing and installation of Safety Class 2 steel and 
concrete structures. The lowest segment of the steel 
liner was installed in May. Three inspections of the 
readiness to start Safety Class 2 concreting were 
performed at the site: levelling casting beneath 
the steel liner, ground slab inside the liner and the 
fastening plates of the containment pre-stressing 
cables. STUK inspected the elements inserted in 
the concrete casting i.e. steel structures, grip plates 
and piping as well as earthings and other protec-
tive devices on buildings.
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Qualiﬁcation and suitability assessment
The utility submitted to STUK for review the plans 
for qualiﬁcation of components and structures 
for accident conditions. STUK made remarks on 
the qualiﬁcation plans and the utility has to take 
them into account when planning and implement-
ing qualiﬁcation. The utility began qualiﬁcation 
of electrical equipment (cabinets and batteries) 
against vibrations arising from seismic events and 
aircraft impacts. STUK witnessed testing.
Modiﬁcations and repairs
Repairs
Several items (e.g. welding and manufacturing de-
fects) requiring repair have surfaced during the 
manufacturing of main components. Welds have 
been repaired in accordance with approved repair 
plans. Of highest importance were repairs of the 
safe-end welds between the reactor pressure ves-
sel and the reactor coolant line as well as repairs 
of the castings of the pump housings of primary 
coolant pumps. The forgings of the primary cool-
ant lines were rejected due to the large grain size 
of their material. A new batch was manufactured 
since the large grain size of the ﬁrst batch does not 
allow for ultrasonic inspection. Defects were de-
tected in the forgings of the reactor pressure vessel 
internals and the vendor decided to manufacture a 
new batch. The vendor manufactured new compo-
nents to replace the pressuriser forgings rejected 
in 2005.
Due to the porosity of the concrete in the base 
slab, caused by too high a water-cement ratio, the 
utility decided to protect the perpendicular walls 
of the base slab with a coating to prevent the entry 
of corrosive agents, among others, into structural 
steels during plant operation. The application of 
the coating was postponed to a later date due to 
the incompleteness of the implementation plan. 
The utility had to have repairs made in the turbine 
building (i.a. additional expansion joints) due to 
design defects. The provisions of the Finnish Code 
of Building Regulations (RakMK) were not appro-
priately observed in design.
Owing to heavy winds at the construction site 
in the autumn, a segment of the steel liner shifted 
from place and suffered damage. The vendor plans 
to locally repair the damage instead of manufac-
turing a replacement segment. Repairs were post-
poned until 2007 due to a delay in the completion 
of their plans.
Signiﬁcant design modiﬁcations
In order to enhance ﬁre safety at the plant, the 
utility implemented modiﬁcations to original de-
sign. STUK required external feed assemblies to 
the safeguard and diesel buildings of the nuclear 
island in order to ensure the supply of ﬁre extin-
guishing water during seismic events. The vendor 
changed the routes of electrical power cables in the 
safeguard buildings to improve their physical sepa-
ration between safety system subsystems.
STUK and the utility have discussed other 
modiﬁcations whose ﬁnal implementation is being 
planned by the vendor. They include, among others, 
installation of room -speciﬁc leak monitoring to 
rooms signiﬁcant to safety, ascertaining the cool-
ing of components and systems important to plant 
safety by increased diversity in heat removal and 
a change in the mode of primary circuit pressure 
reduction to prevent pressuriser heat stratiﬁcation 
during plant shutdown.
Due to the event in Forsmark, the vendor de-
cided to modify the design of the plant’s electrical 
power systems. By the design modiﬁcation, the 
availability of stand-by power supply was made 
independent of the operation of the UPS system. 
The reliability of power supply to the plant’s I&C 
systems was enhanced due to the modiﬁcation. The 
Forsmark event is described in Appendix 4.
3.3.4 Oversight of the operation of 
organisations participating 
in plant construction
STUK oversees the operation of organisations 
when overseeing the implementation of the plant 
project. The operation of organisations participat-
ing in the project is overseen by inspections onsite 
and at the manufacturers’ premises. By its pe-
riodic inspection programme during construction, 
STUK oversees (see Safety management below) 
the utility’s actions to ensure the project’s control-
led implementation. STUK made an investigation 
into the operation of organisations. Its basis and 




By inspections and other supervision STUK 
veriﬁed the organisations’ operational readiness 
for the project’s future phases. Inspected were, 
among others, planning and control of installation 
oversight, storage procedures onsite as well as 
planning and control of the plant’s commissioning, 
STUK found several development needs in the op-
erational instructions and procedures of the utility 
and vendor.
STUK reviewed and supervised the training 
given to personnel who will work at Olkiluoto 3 
and described operator licensing and related re-
quirements to the utility. Together with the util-
ity, STUK audited the planning of training at the 
vendor’s premises. STUK consequently required 
that the utility ascertains the appropriateness of 
operator training material and develops actions to 
supervise vendor training activities. In addition, 
STUK called for procedures to incorporate plant 
design modiﬁcations into operator training.
Safety management
STUK continued inspection of Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy’s operations in accordance with the periodic in-
spection programme during construction. The pro-
gramme is used to inspect and evaluate the utility’s 
operations to ensure high quality implementation 
of the new nuclear power plant. Every six months 
STUK draws up a plan for the programme’s im-
plementation. In 2006 the programme included 
inspection of the project’s main functions, such as 
management, quality management, project man-
agement and safety issues. Inspection of other func-
tions included quality assurance in various ﬁelds, 
training and the utilisation of PSA, the utility’s 
inspection procedures and various technical ﬁelds 
(layout planning, air conditioning systems). Based 
on the inspections, the operation of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy needs to be further improved, particu-
larly as regards procedures pertaining to vendor 
supervision and review of vendor designs.
In order to evaluate the vendor’s operation 
STUK participated in the utility’s audits assess-
ing control room design, training, construction 
site quality management as well as vendor quality 
management and procurement operations.
STUK has participated in 34 utility audits on 
component suppliers to ascertain their capability 
to take part in the plant project. Deﬁciencies were 
established in the operation of many of them; qual-
ity plans speciﬁc to Olkiluoto 3 and changes to im-
prove the operation of organisations were required, 
among others.
Management and quality 
management system
The quality management system of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy contains procedures and responsibili-
ties for the management and implementation of 
the Olkiluoto 3 project. The quality management 
system, which is based on processes, is integrated 
in the operating system of the existing Olkiluoto 
plant units. The project’s quality assurance covers 
the evaluation and control of the operation of the 
project itself and that of its subcontractors, the 
consortium and vendors.
Based on internal audits and the results of 
STUK’s inspections, among others, Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy has maintained and improved the 
project’s management and quality management 
system. The remarks in STUK’s inspection results 
required, among others, that the utility’s internal 
auditing is to be further developed and that any 
defects detected in its operation are to be corrected 
by a given deadline. STUK required that the utility 
develops the systematic analysis of audit observa-
tions such that recurring deﬁciencies would be 
identiﬁed. STUK required the utility to ascertain 
that the quality systems of subcontractors who 
manufacture components important to safety meet 
the quality management requirements and quide-
lines of the respective IAEA quality standards. 
During management system inspections it has 
been required that the utility improves i.a. the 
handling of safety matters and construction con-
trol procedures and initiates actions to develop the 
project organisation.
STUK approved changes to the project’s quality 
management system as presented by the utility.
Human resources in the project’s quality assur-
ance unit have been increased according to plans. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy recruited more quality as-
surance engineers to all areas of technology.
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Inspection and testing organisations as well 
as vendors of nuclear pressure equipment
Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, and 
in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK 
authorised 22 manufacturers of nuclear pressure 
equipment for Olkiluoto 3. In accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act, STUK further authorised 25 
testing organisations to conduct destructive and 
nondestructive testing of mechanical components 
and structures at Olkiluoto 3.
The manufacturers as well as testing and in-
spection organisations authorised by STUK were 
subject to regulatory oversight. Their operation 
was established to comply with the requirements 
of Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3.
Event investigation
On 7 March STUK appointed an investigation team 
to evaluate the management of safety require-
ments during the construction of Olkiluoto 3. After 
the surfacing in February 2006 of non-conformities 
in the casting of the base slab of Olkiluoto 3 in the 
autumn of 2005, STUK considered it necessary to 
examine the procedures for selecting and control-
ling the construction site’s subcontractors as well 
as their capability to meet requirements speciﬁc to 
nuclear power plant construction. The delivery of 
the concrete base slab, the supply chain for the con-
tainment steel liner and the early design stages of 
the polar crane and the material lock were looked 
into as examples.
According to the investigation team, the prob-
lems related to the strict overall schedule of the 
plant project and its framework of costs. The time 
and workload required by detailed planning was 
underestimated when the overall schedule was 
agreed. Most problems in component manufactur-
ing and construction had to do with project man-
agement. This was clearly visible as regards the 
casting of the concrete base slab where the roles 
and responsibilities of various operators turned out 
to be ambiguous. The deﬁnition and management 
of the concrete delivery contract failed due to the 
vendor’s inexperience in construction work.
The vendor’s subcontractors had no earlier ex-
perience of nuclear construction work. During the 
bidding and contract signing phase the inexperi-
enced subcontractors were not informed clearly 
enough about essential quality requirements and 
potential additional costs arising from them. The 
subcontractors’ workers were given insufﬁcient 
training in the code of practice in the nuclear 
power ﬁeld and in the safety signiﬁcance of their 
own work; control and supervision by the vendor 
were insufﬁcient to ensure problem-free execution 
of work.
Control of construction and component manu-
facturing was mainly implemented as planned and 
carried out by competent individuals in the utility 
and vendor organisations. Non-conformities were 
documented by those responsible for quality con-
trol and their repair was monitored. The project’s 
quality organisation had insufﬁcient authority, 
power of execution and courage to intervene with-
out delay in the non-conformities and require their 
correction.
The investigation team emphasised a code of 
practice in accordance with a good safety culture. 
Of importance is the attitude to safety and how 
it shows in everyday work. The aim is that work 
is planned, carried out and documented as well 
as possible; an indifferent attitude to problems or 
quality must not be accepted.
The team gave the plant vendor and orderer sev-
eral recommendations for the quality of plans, the 
presentation of quality assurance requirements, 
the choice, supervision and training of subcontrac-
tors as well as how to deal with non-conformities. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy was given recommenda-
tions on the management of the Olkiluoto 3 project 
and on the promotion of safety culture at the con-
struction site. All organisations contributing to the 
project were given a recommendation pertaining 
to the quality systems and safety culture require-
ments presented in the IAEA’s safety standards; 
the vendor, Teollisuuden Voima Oy and STUK shall 
clarify to their personnel the essential require-
ments of the mentioned safety standards, which 
are to be observed in the operation of organisations 
contributing to construction and component manu-
facture. Any deviations from the requirements 
detected during inspection and audits as well as 
corrective action are to be presented in as concrete 
and unambiguous a manner as possible.
Due to the recommendations, Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy and the vendor drew up a detailed action 
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plan for use by utility and vendor to standardise 
and develop non-conformity reporting and analy-
sis. The aim is to clarify work-related responsibili-
ties, increase supervision and develop instructions, 
among others.
STUK underlined the importance of expertise 
in construction project management and the fact 
that project management and the construction site 
must have sufﬁcient construction expertise. The 
vendor replaced site manager in early November 
and Olkiluoto 3 project leader in early December. 
Job descriptions at the site have been made more 
speciﬁc.
3.3.5 Overall safety assessment
In the overall safety assessment of the new plant 
project, observations are examined that were made 
based on information and experience gained from 
the review of detailed plans, manufacturing and 
construction oversight, the outcome of the periodic 
inspection programme during construction, over-
sight of the vendor and their subcontractors as well 
as dealings between STUK, Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
and the vendor.
Based on the review of detailed plans, STUK is 
able to establish that the plant design has continu-
ously become more detailed but that the vendor 
and the utility still need to improve the drawing up 
of detailed design documents. Attention was paid 
to this, among others, in the investigation’s recom-
mendations. STUK required that the deﬁciencies 
found in the design documents are to be corrected, 
which in practice delays design. Their correction 
is necessary, however, for STUK to review and ap-
prove the detailed design.
Based on the oversight of manufacturing and 
construction STUK established deﬁciencies in the 
operation of both vendor and utility. They were 
dealt with in the investigation results; utility and 
vendor have presented actions by which operation 
can be assumed to improve. Organisations par-
ticipating in the manufacturing of the main compo-
nents as well as vendor and utility have operated 
appropriately but observations indicate a need for 
extensive manufacturing oversight.
Manufacturer and supplier audits showed that 
many operators have not in their work observed 
the quality requirements of the nuclear ﬁeld. 
Attention was paid to this and STUK required 
that Teollisuuden Voima Oy, in co-operation with 
the vendor, draws up unambiguous documents to 
ensure the timely transfer to subcontractors of 
special requirements for quality management and 
assurance.
As a result of the periodic inspection pro-
gramme during construction, STUK was able to 
form an opinion of Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s project 
management, resources, handling of safety mat-
ters, quality management and functions support-
ing these main functions. The outcome of the 
inspection programme showed that the utility’s 
operation is adequate as regards management 
as well as construction planning and control. As 
regards the development needs identiﬁed in opera-
tion, Teollisuuden Voima Oy has presented plans of 
action whose implementation is followed by STUK 
during the project.
Assessment of vendor operation is based on 
dealings with them at meetings, review of docu-
ments drawn up by them, review of their qual-
ity management system and quality management 
plans, review of project manuals, and audits and 
investigation of their operation.
Based on the dealings with the vendor, STUK 
has established that they have sufﬁcient expertise 
to complete the plant’s design. STUK expects the 
management of subcontractors and of the entire 
construction project to improve as a result of ac-
tions taken on account of the investigation, among 
others. The vendor has strengthened the quality 
management and control procedures and resources 
at the site and added new project expertise re-
sources to those available for use by the project 
leadership.
3.4 FiR 1 research reactor
In addition to nuclear power plants, STUK regu-
lates the FiR 1 research reactor operated by the 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. The 
reactor is located in Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maxi-
mum thermal power is 250 kW. It began operation 
in March 1962 and its current operating licence 
will expire at the end of 2011. It is used for produc-
tion of radioactive tracers and for activation analy-
sis, student training and BNTC (Boron Neutron 
Capture Therapy) treatment of tumors as well as 
development of treatment methods.
The reactor continued to operate as in previ-
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ous years. No exceptional events affecting safety 
occurred. Occupational radiation doses and radio-
active releases into the environment were clearly 
below set limits.
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland sub-
mitted to STUK information on an organisational 
change in the reactor’s operation. STUK reviews 
regularly reactor documents referred to in the 
Nuclear Energy Act. Reactor rules and regulations 
were submitted to STUK for approval. STUK made 
regular operational safety inspections according 
to an annual plan. Four reactor foremen and one 
operator were authorised by STUK.
The most concrete technical maintenance meas-
ures at the research reactor in the future will focus 
on nuclear fuel as well as the control and monitor-
ing system. A human resources and training plan 
has been drawn up on the handling of important 
safety tasks by the FiR 1 operating staff. The reac-
tor’s responsible manager may continue until the 
end of the operating licence period. The next regu-
lar renewal of operator authorisations in 2007 and 
2008 will apply to several reactor operators.
According to the nuclear waste management 
plan for the FiR 1 reactor, approved by the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, the spent nuclear fuel may 
returned to its country of origin (the United States) 
after the expiration of the present operating li-
cence.
The operational safety of the FiR 1 reactor, the 
availability of its structures, systems and compo-
nents as well as its human resources and the re-
lated plans are adequate for the present operating 
licence period.
3.5 Other nuclear facilities
The regulatory control of nuclear facilities relat-
ing to nuclear waste management, such as storage 
space, is dealt with in Chapter 4.
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4 Nuclear waste management regulation
Esko Ruokola
4.1 Nuclear waste management 
programmes
In accordance with the policy outlined in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry letter of 3 
November 2002, Posiva Oy, Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
and Fortum Power and Heat Oy published the re-
port TKS-2006, Nuclear waste management of the 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa power plants, Programme 
for research, development and technical design for 
2007–2009. It is an overview of the R&D and tech-
nical design in the ﬁeld of nuclear waste manage-
ment by Posiva and its owners in the recent years 
and also a plan for future activities. It is focused on 
the years 2007–2009.
The report on nuclear waste management, put 
out by the utilities in 2006, was largely based 
on the above TKS-2006 report. STUK reviewed 
the utilities’ nuclear waste management related 
documents and drew up a statement on them in 
accordance with section 78 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree.
STUK reviewed also updated documents on the 
ﬁnancial provision made for the costs of nuclear 
waste management referred to in section 90 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree and gave statements 
on them to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In 
its statements STUK assessed the technical plans 
and cost estimates on which ﬁnancial provision is 
based.
4.2 Spent nuclear fuel
4.2.1 Intermediate storage
STUK oversaw spent nuclear fuel storage by regu-
lar inspections and review of the plans for and work 
on storage systems. No safety-endangering events 
occurred in the operation of the storage facilities. 
The volume of spent fuel onsite the Olkiluoto plant 
at the end of 2006 was 6510 assemblies (1147 tU, 
tonnes of original uranium), with an increase of 
226 assemblies (41 tU) in 2006. Corresponding ac-
cumulation at the Loviisa plant was 3361 assem-
blies (403 tU) with an increase of 204 assemblies 
(25 tU). A decision has been made to increase the 
storage capacity of the Loviisa plant by the intro-
duction of fuel racks that can take more fuel as-
semblies. STUK in 2006 approved the pre-inspec-
tion documentation for the fuel racks.
4.2.2 Preparation for ﬁnal disposal
Posiva Oy’s operations most important from the 
nuclear safety regulatory point of view are as fol-
lows:
Encapsulation and ﬁnal disposal
The design of Posiva’s encapsulation and ﬁnal dis-
posal facilities has progressed based on long-term 
planning and preliminary design stage plans were 
completed towards the end of 2006. The develop-
ment of waste canister manufacturing techniques 
continued in co-operation with the Swedish nucle-
ar waste company SKB. Using the pierce and draw 
method, which is Posiva’s responsibility, the ﬁrst 
copper canister with an integrated bottom that 
meets the given speciﬁcations was manufactured 
in Germany in 2006. The canister’s iron insert 
casting tests at the Rautpohja foundry, Jyväskylä, 
produced a canister that meets both geometric re-
quirements and those set for the casting material.
In co-operation with Patria, Posiva has contin-
ued copper canister lid electron beam welding tests 
at Linnavuori factory in Nokia. Posiva has made 
distinct progress in welding technology develop-
ment. Development of canister inspection tech-
niques has become more well-deﬁned and Posiva 
has started planning of the inspection qualiﬁcation 
procedure.
STUK made a review of the waste canister de-
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sign report published in 2005; the outcome of the 
review was submitted to Posiva and the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry for information. A database 
on open issues relating to the development of en-
gineered barriers was set up and updated by both 
STUK and Posiva.
In 2006 Posiva launched its own bentonite buff-
er project, the BENTO-project, to reply questions 
relating to the performance of bentonite and to de-
velop manufacturing and installation technologies 
as well as domestic expertise in the ﬁeld. R&D in 
tunnel backﬁlling techniques will be implemented 
in co-operation with SKB within the framework of 
the Baclo project whose second phase is nearing 
completion.
The most signiﬁcant design and development 
projects in ﬁnal disposal relate to the horizontal 
disposal of waste canisters (the so called KBS-3H 
concept). Posiva has a development programme 
on this concept with SKB, extending to 2007. 
Preparatory work for full-scale demonstration 
tests has begun at the Äspö hard rock laboratory 
in Sweden.
Site investigations
Posiva Oy continued conﬁrming repository site in-
vestigations and construction of the underground 
research facility ONKALO. Following a change in 
the mode of operation made in 2006 Posiva now 
acts as construction developer and oversees con-
struction work and its quality. The project sched-
ule and cost estimate were revised following the 
change. ONKALO’s construction proceeded accord-
ing to the revised schedule: by the end of the year, 
excavation depth was approx. 160 metres.
In 2006 STUK intensiﬁed oversight of 
ONKALO’s construction. The number of inspec-
tions made at the construction site was 26. In 
addition, an ONKALO construction inspection pro-
gramme was launched within the framework of 
which four inspections were made. Follow-up meet-
ings and semiannual meetings to comprehensively 
review issues with Posiva continued according to 
previous usage. A list of open issues pertaining 
to Olkiluoto’s conﬁrming site investigations was 
updated twice with the assistance of an interna-
tional team of experts. Assisted by the same team, 
STUK is currently assessing the quality guides for 
safety critical functions pertaining to ONKALO’s 
construction.
Posiva’s newest update on the ONKALO re-
gion’s rock model is expected to be completed in 
early 2007. An analysis of disturbances arising 
from ONKALO’s construction was updated and, 
based on it, recommendations for sealing strate-
gies and methods will be reviewed. Research on 
excavation damage zones in ONKALO was begun. 
The ﬁrst niche for the purpose of geological inves-
tigations in ONKALO was completed towards the 
end of 2006.
Posiva drilled four new deep holes in the in-
vestigation area and conducted established geo-
physical and hydrological investigations there. One 
research excavation was mapped for rock ﬁssuring, 
rock type distribution and degree of alteration. 
The ﬁrst summary reports on the monitoring pro-
gramme in the ONKALO area were completed. 
An extensive description of the bedrock research 
methods used by Posiva in investigations made 
from surface and in research done in ONKALO was 
completed. In addition, numerous other interpreta-
tions of investigations made in Olkiluoto and also 
geological background analyses were published in 
the Posiva report series.
Safety research
Posiva’s safety research is mostly based on long-
term bi- or multilateral collaboration projects. 
Most bilateral research projects are contained in 
the Posiva/SKB (Sweden) collaboration, which was 
renewed in 2006. The most signiﬁcant multilat-
eral projects are the integrated projects NF-PRO, 
FUNMIG, PAMINA and THERESA within the 
EU’s sixth framework programme in which Posiva 
and Finnish research institutes participate.
Posiva organised the compilation of the safety 
case via the SAFCA project set up in 2005. The 
project objective is to attend to the development 
of the necessary expertise as well. Posiva’s safety 
case strategy is contained in the report ‘Plan for 
Safety Case’. The future safety case will be pub-
lished as a Safety Case Portfolio, which will consist 
of ten main reports to be updated every few years. 
In 2006 Posiva published the ﬁrst version of a 
Portfolio report that includes a description of the 
evolution of the site and the repository.
In 2005–2006 Posiva completed an extensive 
set of reports on the Olkiluoto biosphere. One of 
the objectives of these safety cases is to provide in-
formation for the baseline of the disposal site: the 
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second update to the report in question (Olkiluoto 
Site Description 2006) comes out in early 2007. A 
second main objective is to produce initial data and 
modelling tools for a biosphere analysis contained 
in the Safety Case Portfolio. A summary report of 
the analysis was published in 2006.
Posiva’s other safety research focused on the 
studies and modelling of the performance of engi-
neered barriers (uranium matrix, waste canister, 
bentonite buffer, backﬁlling materials) of the dis-
posal system. The objects of research speciﬁcally 
included mutual interactions between barriers as 
well as those between them and substances in 
ground water.
4.3 Low and intermediate level waste
The utilities followed earlier practices in their low 
and intermediate level waste maintenance. No 
safety-related problems occurred in the treatment, 
storage and ﬁnal disposal of waste.
The volume of low and intermediate level waste 
onsite the Loviisa plant at the end of the year was 
2990 m³. Volume increase from 2005 is 150 m³. 
Corresponding waste accumulation at the Olkiluoto 
plant was 6011 m³ and the increase was 586 m³. 
Approx. 47% of the waste from the Loviisa plant 
and approx. 76% of that at the Olkiluoto plant has 
been disposed of. At the Loviisa plant, maintenance 
waste taken to the Kymenlaakson Jäte Oy landﬁll 
and recyclable scrap metal were cleared from con-
trol. At the Olkiluoto plant, maintenance waste 
taken for burial at the local landﬁll, waste oil taken 
to Ekokem Oy, recyclable scrap metal and some re-
usable components were cleared from control.
The most important low and intermediate level 
waste projects at the Loviisa plant are the commis-
sioning of a solidiﬁcation facility and of an exten-
sion to the disposal facility, due in early 2007 ac-
cording to current plans. At ﬁrst, only evaporation 
residues will be solidiﬁed and disposed of; treat-
ment of ion exchange resins will only be started 
when experience has been gained of the operation 
of the solidiﬁcation facility. STUK has approved, 
with certain additional requirements, an update to 
the safety case pertaining to the extension of the 
Loviisa ﬁnal disposal facility.
The Loviisa plant plans to develop low and in-
termediate level waste management by taking into 
use facilities for the centralised treatment, activity 
measurement and temporary storage of waste. A 
relevant plan has been completed and project reali-
sation is due in 2006–2009.
The planning of Olkiluoto-3 radioactive waste 
treatment systems reached detailed planning 
phase and STUK reviewed the relevant systems 
descriptions.
In accordance with the operating licence condi-
tions, the safety case for the Olkiluoto ﬁnal facility 
for low and intermediate level waste (VLJ reposi-
tory) was updated towards the end of 2006, con-
sidering the experiences gained and the research 
completed over the repository’s operating lifetime 
so far. The updated safety case includes the dispos-
al of waste from Olkiluoto 3 in the VLJ repository. 
STUK will review the safety case update and sub-
mit a statement about it to the Ministry of Trade 
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5.1 Safeguards of nuclear materials
5.1.1 Safeguards at Finnish nuclear facilities
The objective of STUK’s safeguards activities is 
to take care of the control necessary to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, 
STUK’s task is to attend to the control pertaining 
to international agreements in the ﬁeld of nucle-
ar energy signed by Finland. International safe-
guards are implemented by the IAEA and EU safe-
guards by the European Commission’s Directorate-
General for Transport and Energy, Directorates H 
and I. IAEA safeguards are based on the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193) signed by the non-nu-
clear EU member states, the European Atomic 
Energy Agency and the IAEA. EU safeguards are 
based on the Euratom Treaty and Commission 
Regulation EURATOM 302/2005.
Insofar as nuclear power plants are concerned, 
STUK’s safeguards activities are mostly focused 
on fuel import, transport, storage, internal trans-
fers and refuelling. The utilities submit to STUK 
activity programmes, advance notiﬁcations and 
reports relevant to their nuclear material man-
agement.
Ten inspections were carried out at Loviisa 
power plant and 16 inspections at Olkiluoto plant, 
totalling in 26 inspections at the Finnish plants. 
Euratom participated in 21 and the IAEA in 24 of 
them. STUK made six safeguards related inspec-
tions at the construction site of the Olkiluoto ﬁnal 
repository.
In addition to nuclear power plants, minor 
amounts of nuclear materials are used at other 
facilities. The most signiﬁcant of these is FiR 1, 
the research reactor operated by VTT, where one 
inspection was made. It was carried out by STUK, 
the IAEA and Euratom. In addition to VTT’s 
FiR 1 research reactor, STUK, the Laboratory of 
Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, OMG 
Kokkola Chemicals, the University of Jyväskylä, 
the Geological Survey of Finland and some oth-
er small nuclear materials holders have small 
amounts of nuclear materials in their possession. 
The amounts of nuclear materials at Finnish facili-
ties are given in Table 2 and licences and approv-
als in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act in 
Appendix 4.
An important objective of nuclear material safe-
guards is to verify that the data on nuclear materi-
als reported by the operators, such as burn-up and 
cooling time, are correct and complete. STUK veri-
ﬁed by non-destructive methods 24 and 58 spent 
fuel assemblies at Olkiluoto and Loviisa power 
plants respectively. For the Olkiluoto measure-
ments, the gamma burn up veriﬁcation (GBUV) 
method was used, which reveals i.a. a missing rod. 
The use of GBUV requires fuel transfers, which 
limits the number of assemblies that can be meas-
ured. For the Loviisa measurements, a spent fuel 
attribute tester (SFAT) attached to the fuel transfer 
machine was used, which facilitates measurements 
without fuel assembly transfers. SFAT measure-
ments facilitate veriﬁcation of operator-given data. 
In Loviisa, an EFORK measuring device was used 
to measure three spent fuel assemblies and 19 
dummy elements. EFORK requires fuel transfer 
and is thus slower than SFAT.
Seven Euratom and 28 IAEA inspectors were 
approved to carry out inspections in Finland.
Each material balance area operated in compli-
ance with STUK-approved manuals and in a way 
facilitating STUK’s fulﬁlling of the obligations 
















Loviisa plant – 485 407 – 4 015 –
Olkiluoto 1 – 188 156 – 756 –
Olkiluoto 2 – 192 881 – 862 –
Olkiluoto / Spent fuel storage 
(KPA)
– 911 744 – 7 621 –
VTT/FiR 1 research reactor 1 511 60 0.002 – –
OMG Kokkola Chemicals 2 613 – – – –
STUK 44.7 1.4 823 0.003 2.5
University of Helsinki, 
laboratory of radiochemistry
40.4 0.3 20 0.003 2.5
Other facilities ~0 ~0 ~817 ~0 –
5.1.2 Activities in accordance with the 
Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540)
To facilitate the IAEA’s discovery of secret nuclear 
programmes, an Additional Protocol to the Nuclear 
Materials Safeguards Agreement has been drawn 
up to intensify the IAEA safeguards and extend 
their scope. By virtue of the Protocol, the IAEA is 
entitled to receive from states data more extensive 
than previously on the nuclear fuel cycle, R&D 
projects included. In addition, the IAEA is entitled 
to gather data on open sources, to operate satellites 
and to collect environmental samples. For assur-
ance of state given data, the IAEA has a more-ex-
tensive-than-before right of access enabling veri-
ﬁcation of reported functions. The IAEA is also 
entitled to make complementary access visits at 
very brief notice. The Additional Protocol came into 
force within the EU on 30 April 2004.
STUK prepared declarations required in the 
Protocol, the most important of which were de-
scriptions of plant sites and of R&D pertaining to 
the nuclear fuel cycle. STUK delivered within the 
given time limits direct to the IAEA, and for in-
formation to the Commission in May, declarations 
that were Finland’s responsibility, and those under 
the joint responsibility of the Commission and 
Finland to the Commission and for information to 
the IAEA in March. The Commission further deliv-
ered the updates of declarations under its own re-
sponsibility and of those it was jointly responsible 
for with Finland to the IAEA and for information to 
STUK in May. In addition, Finland delivered quar-
terly information about exportations in accordance 
with the Protocol. STUK delivered to the IAEA and 
the Commission a total of 14 declarations and the 
Commission to the IAEA four declarations pertain-
ing to Finland. On 17 November the IAEA con-
ducted at the Loviisa plant site a complementary 
audit in accordance with the Protocol at two hours’ 
notice. The Commission participated in the audit.
5.1.3 Safeguards for ﬁnal disposal
The ﬁnal disposal of nuclear fuel in an underground 
repository presents new challenges to safeguards 
implementation since, after encapsulation, direct 
veriﬁcation of nuclear material will be impossible. 
By virtue of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
the government is under obligation to facilitate ef-
fective IAEA safeguards in Finland. STUK has con-
sidered it appropriate to oblige Posiva Oy, who are 
looking into ﬁnal disposal and its implementation, 
to take care, in the manner of a nuclear facility, of 
the implementation of nuclear safeguards during 
the construction of the underground research facil-
ity (ONKALO) of the ﬁnal repository. This decision 
aims to assure the IAEA of Finland’s capability to 
implement sufﬁcient safeguards and to plan na-
tional control and inspection procedures. In accord-
ance with Commission Regulation (EURATOM) 
302/2005, licensees are obliged to submit technical 
basic data on new facilities not later than 200 days 
prior to the estimated receipt of the ﬁrst batch of 
nuclear materials. On 11 May STUK forwarded to 
the IAEA a summary of the inspections made dur-
ing the ﬁrst year of ONKALO’s construction and 
reported the project as part of regulatory oversight 
in accordance with the Additional Protocol.
As regards the ﬁnal disposal facility, STUK ap-
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proved an update to the Code of conduct for nuclear 
non-proliferation in ONKALO, prepared by Posiva, 
which is equivalent to a nuclear material account-
ing and control manual. It focuses on the veriﬁca-
tion of construction documents and environmental 
monitoring prior to the handling and transfer of 
nuclear materials to the underground facilities. 
STUK approved and introduced into use an YTV 
quality manual on nuclear non-proliferation dur-
ing the construction of the ﬁnal repository.
During 2006, inspections of the underground 
research facility (ONKALO) of the ﬁnal repository 
were mostly implemented simultaneously with 
oversight usages relating to the construction of 
ONKALO. As regards nuclear non-proliferation, 
before the covering of rock surfaces, it was veriﬁed 
by six systematic inspections that the excavated 
premises were equivalent to the as-built documen-
tation. A meeting of a group of consultants discuss-
ing the long-term safety of nuclear waste manage-
ment for ﬁnal disposal and the related visit to the 
underground premises under construction were 
attended on 31 May 2006 by two IAEA inspec-
tors as observers during STUK’s inspection of the 
premises. Towards the end of 2006, STUK inspect-
ed Posiva’s nuclear material safeguards system 
and veriﬁed the excavated premises.
5.2 Control of radioactive 
materials transport
About 20 000 radioactive packages are transported 
in Finland every year. No accidents or safety haz-
ards involving the transport of radioactive mate-
rials occurred in 2006. The transport of nuclear 
materials requires a licence from STUK. The condi-
tions for the licence include nuclear liability insur-
ance and sufﬁcient physical protection. STUK ap-
proved three transport plans for the import of fresh 
fuel. The most signiﬁcant cases of nuclear material 
transport were the imports of fresh nuclear fuel 
to the Finnish nuclear power plants from Sweden, 
Spain and Russia.
The import of radioactive and nuclear materials 
is subject to a licence. No attempts on illicit import 
were detected at the Finnish border.
No illicit trafﬁcking of radioactive materials 
was detected at the border in 2001−2005. The high-
est number, 23 consignments, was turned back 
in 1997. The reason was typically radioactivity 
measured in scrap metal. The decrease in number 
is partly due to the most signiﬁcant consignors now 
measuring the radioactivity of their scrap metal. 
On the other hand, also the number of consign-
ments of scrap metal to Finland has decreased.
Safeguards as well as the supervision and con-
trol of nuclear material transport are described in 
more detail in the report Nuclear Safeguards in 
Finland 2006 (STUK-B 74).
5.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing. The Treaty 
was opened for signing in 1996. It enters into 
force after ratiﬁcation by 44 separately designated 
states. Finland ratiﬁed it in 1999. Compliance with 
the Treaty is monitored by an international obser-
vation network, which, when complete, will com-
prise 321 monitoring stations. Of the stations, 80 
measure radioactive particles in the atmosphere. 
The results are available for use by all member 
states.
A special Preparatory Commission, which as-
sembles in Vienna, is preparing for the Treaty’s 
coming into force. All States Signatories are repre-
sented in it. The Provisional Technical Secretariat 
that works i.a. on the establishment of an interna-
tional observation network operates in Vienna as 
well
The National Data Centre (NDC), which is based 
on the CTBT and operates in conjunction with 
STUK, contributed to the work of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in establishing 
a cost-effective organisation that is functional from 
the Finnish point of view. The NDC’s own auto-
matic routine monitoring was in operation for the 
whole year, analysing results yielded by stations 
detecting radioactive particles in the atmosphere. 
Routine monitoring is facilitated by an alarm sys-
tem transmitting data on unusual observations to 
the NDC personnel. No abnormal activity levels 
were observed by the NDC.
The North Korean underground nuclear test 
on 9 October 2006 was detected by seismic obser-
vation stations whose operation is based on the 
Treaty. No radioactive particles possibly leaked to 
the atmosphere from the test were detected by the 
observation stations due to the incompleteness of 
the observation network in the Far East and the 
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unfavourable winds prevalent in the area of oper-
ating observation stations.
Under the auspices of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, The NDC arranged in November a 3-day 
course on the operation of the NDC, directed in 
particular to the data centres of developing coun-
tries. Participants from the data centres of the 
Philippines, Kenya, Malaysia, Peru and Uganda 
attended.
The functioning and reliability of the NDC’s 
data processing system was improved by the pur-
chase of a backup disc drive for data storage and by 
the decentralisation of functions to various servers 
with automated status monitoring. In addition, 
analyses activities were developed.
In 2002 STUK signed an agreement with the 
developers of the analysis programme used by the 
NDC about its handing over to the national data 
centres of other countries for use in CTBT work. In 
2006 the programme was delivered to the national 
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STUK gave a statement on the publicly-funded 
SAFIR research programme for 2006 in January 
and on the KYT2010 programme in February. The 
purpose of the programmes is to ascertain the 
maintenance and development of Finnish expertise 
in nuclear safety and nuclear waste management. 
STUK controls this research by contributing to the 
work of the programmes’ steering and reference 
groups. 
The programme of the last year in the SAFIR 
2003–2006 research programme was essentially 
equivalent to those of the previous years. The 
project entity comprised 22 research projects with 
a total volume of €5 million. It focused on fuel and 
the reactor core, the reactor coolant circuit and its 
mechanical components, the containment and proc-
ess safety. Research included control rooms, pro-
grammable I&C, safety culture, and management 
of risk-informed safety. The research projects con-
tain theoretical and empirical research important 
for the assurance and development of expertise. 
The research projects include projects to develop 
technical expertise and those relating to the op-
eration of organisations. They include a training 
angle. The ﬁnal seminar of the SAFIR 2003–2006 
research programme took place in January 2007.
During the ﬁrst half of 2006, a proposal for a 
new framework plan for a publicly-funded nuclear 
safety research programme for 2007–2010 was 
prepared as well as a proposal for how to organise 
it. STUK headed the planning and contributed 
actively to the preparation of the proposal. The 
work was implemented as a strategy process span-
ning the whole spring, with 90 experts in the ﬁeld 
contributing during the various phases of the proc-
ess. The general plan for the SAFIR2010 research 
programme, proposed by the work group, was 
published in conjunction with the research pro-
gramme’s call for projects in September. The new 
programme’s steering and reference groups began 
work right after the call for projects had expired. 
At the end of the year they prepared a proposal for 
the project entity to be funded in 2007. Information 
about the SAFIR programme can be found at 
http://virtual.vtt.ﬁ/saﬁr/.
In early 2006 a new 5-year research programme, 
the KYT2010, was launched and, like the previous 
KYT programme, it focuses on strategic analyses 
of nuclear waste management. New topics include 
nuclear non-proliferation and sociological research. 
In March 2006, a ﬁnal seminar was held where the 
results of research in 2002–2005 and the KYT2010 
programme were presented. The KYT programme 
for 2006 comprised 19 research projects with a 
total volume of €1.2 million. Information about the 
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7.1 Processes and structures
STUK ascertains by inspection and other over-
sight that the prerequisites for operation, and the 
operation, of the licensee and their subcontractors 
as well as the systems, structures and components 
of nuclear facilities meet set safety requirements. 
STUK’s oversight is composed of document reviews 
and various types of inspections onsite or at the 
suppliers’ premises. The YVL guides presuppose 
document review as well as inspections onsite or at 
the suppliers’ premises. In addition, STUK carries 
out its own inspection programmes during con-
struction and operation, and resident inspectors 
work at the plant site. The inspection procedures 
are described in the quality manual for nuclear 
safety regulation. Document review, the various 
types of inspection and the related indicators are 
described in more detail below. The results of the 
review and inspections are dealt with in Chapters 
3–5 of this report.
Document review
A total of 3148 documents were submitted to STUK 
for review, 1395 of which concerned the plant un-
der construction. The number of completed docu-
ment reviews was 2677, including documents 
submitted in 2006, those submitted earlier and 
licences granted by STUK in accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act, which are listed in Appendix 
5. Average document review time was 53 days. The 
number of documents and their average review 
times in 2002–2006 are given in Fig 8. Figs 9, 10 
and 11 give the distribution of document review 
times at each plant unit. Figure 8. Number of documents received and reviewed 
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Inspections onsite and at suppliers’ premises
Safety management, the main processes and proce-
dures of operation as well as the technical accept-
ability of systems were looked into in inspections of 
the periodic inspection programme. The compliance 
of plant safety assessment, operation, maintenance 
and protection activities with the requirements of 
nuclear safety regulations was veriﬁed by the in-
spections. The annual inspection programme was 
brought to the attention of the licensee early in the 
year and the inspection dates were agreed upon 
with the licensee’s representatives. The inspections 
contained in the periodic inspection programme 
are given in Appendix 6.
The construction inspection programme of 
Olkiluoto 3 aims to verify that the functions re-
quired by the construction of the plant ensure 
high quality implementation in accordance with 
approved plans in compliance with regulations and 
without endangering the plants already operating 
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on the site. The inspection programme assesses 
and supervises the licensee’s activities to imple-
ment the plant project, the procedures pertaining 
to the plant’s construction in the various technical 
ﬁelds involved, licensee expertise and their use of 
it, handling of safety matters, and quality manage-
ment and control. STUK draws up a bi-annual plan 
for the Olkiluoto 3 inspections. Inspections of the 
periodic inspection programme during construction 
are given in Appendix 7.
The data acquisition methods used in the in-
spections were reports requested from utility rep-
resentatives, personnel interviews, document re-
views, walk rounds and observation of working 
practices. None of the observations thus made had 
signiﬁcant bearing on the safety of the plant units.
Thirty inspections of the periodic inspection 
programme were conducted, 15 at each plant. One 
of the inspections planned for the Loviisa plant 
was postponed to 2007.
STUK conducted 12 inspections in accordance 
with the periodic inspection programme imple-
mented during the construction of Olkiluoto 3.
A total of 840 inspections (other than inspec-
tions of the periodic or construction inspection pro-
grammes, of the safeguards of nuclear materials 
and of the construction inspection programme of 
the Olkiluoto underground research facility, which 
are looked into later in this document) onsite or at 
the suppliers’ premises were made. An inspection 
comprises one or several partial inspections such 
as a review of results documentation, an inspection 
of a component or structure, a pressure or leakage 
test, a functional test or a commissioning inspec-
tion. Of the inspections, 220 pertained to oversight 
of the plant under construction and 620 to that of 
the operating plants. Relevant documents are re-
viewed prior to onsite inspection.
The total number of inspection days onsite and 
at the component manufacturers’ premises during 
ofﬁce hours was 2024. Not only inspections per-
taining to the safety of nuclear power plants but 
also nuclear waste management and safeguards 
inspections are included as well as audits and 
inspection of the Olkiluoto underground research 
facility. In addition, 239 inspection days outside the 
ofﬁce hours were spent at the operating nuclear 
power plants, mostly during annual maintenance 
outages as well as 35 inspection days at the plant 
under construction. The number of days spent on 
Figure 9. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
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Figure 10. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on the Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2.
Figure 11. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
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inspection has increased due to inspections relat-
ing to the construction of the new nuclear power 
plant. Two resident inspectors worked at Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant. Two new resident inspec-
tors were recruited one of which began work in 
Olkiluoto in early September. The Loviisa plant 
has one resident inspector. The number of inspec-
tion days onsite in 2002–2006 is given in Fig. 12.
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STUK’s own development projects
The development of own operation focused on proc-
esses, development of data systems that support 
operation as well as development of interaction 
between regulatory authorities and those subject 
to regulation. Process-related work consisted of the 
updating of the contents of the guidelines in the 
quality manual on nuclear power plant regulation 
and of the changing of the division of the guides 
to make them correspond to today’s processes. 
Recommendations given during an investigation 
relating to the construction of Olkiluoto 3 were 
taken into consideration in the updating of the 
quality manual.
The periodic inspection programme (KTO) was 
evaluated in the spring of 2006. As the evaluation 
objective, development of own operation had been 
set such that objectives set for the KTO would be 
fulﬁlled better and more effectively than before. 
All persons in charge of inspections participated in 
the evaluation. Development actions were decided 
based on the outcome of the evaluation: underlin-
ing of the role of the KTO, more distinct focusing 
of inspections according to safety functions, digi-
talisation of inspection documents, enhancement of 
annual planning and training relating to the KTO 
programme.
The relationship between the regulatory au-
thority and the licensees was studied by interview-
ing 28 persons from the operating power plants 
and the unit under construction. The objective was 
to ﬁnd out the functionality of the procedures in 
use at the department of nuclear reactor regula-
tion and also utility attitudes towards the depart-
ment’s operation at present. By the interviews also 
matters relating to interaction and co-operation 
as experienced by representatives of the utilities 
were mapped. Another objective was to evaluate 
the fulﬁlment in regulatory work of the principles 
presented in the quality manual for nuclear safety 
regulation and to compare the results to those of 
earlier surveys.
The results show the licensees are mostly 
satisﬁed with STUK’s operation. Regulatory prin-
ciples and values are well realised, openness 
and interactivity have increased. The licensees 
appreciate the authority’s expertise and the well-
functioning co-operation between themselves and 
the authority. They also valued STUK’s service 
attitude and efﬁcient decision-making when in 
a hurry. However, they would like to see STUK 
operate more consistently and present a more 
uniform requirement level. In addition, the sug-
gestion was made that any forthcoming changes 
in the regulatory practice should be more actively 
announced in the future.
A separate project (the Onkalo monitoring 
project, ONP) was set up directly under the man-
agement team of the Department of Nuclear Waste 
and Material Regulation to enhance the oversight 
of the construction of Posiva Oy’s underground 
research facility at Olkiluoto. The project was set 
up to ensure that the design and construction of 
the research facility proceeds without compromis-
ing the long-term safety of ﬁnal disposal and in 
accordance with regulations. The objective is that 
the research facility is constructed such that it can 
be later approved as part of the ﬁnal disposal facil-
ity to be constructed at Olkiluoto. Assisting in the 
oversight of the underground research facility is 
a team consisting of external experts, which looks 
into special issues addressed to it and evaluates 
Posiva’s reports and matters relating to the con-
struction of Onkalo.
The renewal of STUK’s entire strategy was 
launched and, related to that, the compilation of 
plans of action pertaining to nuclear power plants, 
nuclear waste management and nuclear non-prolif-
eration was begun.
In their development seminars the divisions of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Waste 
and Material Regulation discussed the roles and 
responsibilities of director, manager, and expert in 
a regulatory organisation.
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Development of document management
The long-term project to develop a records manage-
ment solution for STUK continued.
The RM (Records Management) system sup-
plied by Affecto-Genimap Oy will in the near future 
replace STUK’s existing separate records systems 
and registers. The new system makes possible 
internal digital records management (workﬂow) 
at STUK. The system preliminarily provides for 
electronic services to external clients. A complete 
review and updating of STUK’s registry establish-
ment plan (AMS) has been launched as well.
7.2 Renewal and human resources
Development of competence continued based on 
earlier plans. Own training focused on increas-
ing knowledge of the features of facility design of 
the new plant. Newly recruited personnel were 
given basic professional training in nuclear safety 
in Finland arranged for the fourth time by STUK 
in the autumn in co-operation with other parties 
active in the nuclear ﬁeld. In addition, two nucle-
ar materials inspectors participated in the course 
“Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation”, ar-
ranged by European Safeguards Research and 
Development Association (ESARDA).
Recruitments continued to ensure adequate 
know-how and personnel resources. Four new ex-
perts were recruited for the Department of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation and the recruitment of two 
more was begun. Those newly recruited became 
resident inspectors for the new plant in Olkiluoto 
and inspectors in the ﬁeld of mechanical equip-
ment as well as in their manufacturing and inspec-
tion techniques. The resident inspectors underwent 
an approx. 6-month orientation period at STUK’s 
premises in Helsinki. One began work in Olkiluoto 
in the autumn 2006 and the other in early 2007. 
The resident inspectors speciﬁcally follow and 
evaluate the operation of organisations onsite. 
With the development of Posiva Oy’s operations, 
additional resources are needed also in the over-
sight of nuclear waste management. Towards the 
end of the year, the recruitment of ﬁve new person-
nel for oversight of the repository project and of 
low and intermediate level waste was begun.
As part of the launching of work on STUK’s 
strategy, the work atmosphere in the Department 
of Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation was 
mapped and, based on the results, a development 
project was begun in co-operation with an external 
consultant. Nuclear waste regulation was conse-
quently reorganised in early 2007.
Figure 14. The cost of research and commissioned 
















  Technical support for regulatory decision making











  Regulatory control income
  Costs of regulatory control subject to a charge
  Regulatory control total costs
Figure 13. Income and costs of nuclear safety regula-
tion.
Figure 15. The cost of research and commissioned 
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Table 3. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Basic operations subject to a charge 27.6 29.2 44.7 47.1 53.6
Basic operations not subject to a charge 6.9 6.4 5.1 7.2 5.7
Contracted services 3.8 4.9 5.1 3.3 3.0
Rule-making and support functions 27.1 28.2 22.7 27.5 28.8
Holidays and absences 16.2 15.9 16.9 16.9 20.0
Total 81.6 84.6 94.5 101.9 111.0
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7.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation includ-
ed basic operations subject and not subject to a 
charge. Basic operations subject to a charge mostly 
comprised of the regulatory control of nuclear fa-
cilities, with their costs charged to those subject 
to control. Those basic operations not subject to a 
charge included international and domestic co-op-
eration as well as emergency response and commu-
nications. Basic operations not subject to a charge 
are publicly funded. Overheads from rule-making 
and support functions (administration, develop-
ment projects in support of nuclear safety regula-
tion, training, maintenance and development of 
expertise, reporting and participation in nuclear 
safety research) were carried forward into the costs 
of both types of basic operation and of contracted 
services in relation to the number of working hours 
spent on each function.
The costs of the regulatory control of nuclear 
safety subject to a charge were €10.1 million. The 
total costs of nuclear safety regulation were €11.1 
million Thus the share of activities subject to a 
charge was 90.8%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation was 
€10.1million. Of this, €2.0 million and €7.2 million 
came from the inspection and review of Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants, respectively. In ad-
dition to the operating plant units, the income from 
the Olkiluoto plant includes regulatory control of 
the new plant unit. The regulation of Posiva Oy’s 
operations yielded €0.8 million. Figure 13 gives the 
annual income and costs of nuclear safety regula-
tion in 2002−2006.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 11.3 person-years, 
i.e. 10.3% of the total working time of the nuclear 
regulatory personnel. For Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant’s operating units it was 9.8 person-years, 
which accounts for 8.8% of total working time. 
In addition to the oversight of the operation of 
nuclear power plants, the ﬁgure includes nuclear 
material control. The time spent on the inspection 
and review of Olkiluoto 3 was 27.6 person-years, 
i.e. 24.9% of total working time. The time spent on 
nuclear waste management inspection and review 
was 4.9 person-years and that spent on the FiR 1 
research reactor 0.08 person-years. The working 
time spent on small-scale users of nuclear material 
was 0.02 person-years.
Where necessary, STUK commissions independ-
ent safety analyses and research in support of 
regulatory decision-making. Figures 14 and 15 give 
the costs of nuclear safety research in 2002−2006. 
In addition to technical support projects, the pre-
2005 ﬁgures show the costs of national nuclear 
safety research. The costs for 2006 mostly relate 
to reference analyses and independent assess-
ments made for the plant unit under construction. 
Appendix 8 lists completed STUK-ﬁnanced techni-
cal support projects.
The distribution of the yearly working time of 
the nuclear regulatory personnel according to duty 
areas is given in Table 3. Figure 16 presents the 






STUK organised several training events and ex-
ercises to test and develop its own emergency re-
sponse. In addition, STUK supervises the emergen-
cy preparedness of the operating organisations of 
nuclear power plants to act in abnormal situations. 
No situations occurred that would have endan-
gered the safety of the population or the environ-
ment and would have required protective action.
The emergency response systems of nuclear 
power plants have been under continuous develop-
ment during plant operation and regularly tested 
in emergency exercises as part of emergency pre-
paredness training. Other related training by the 
licensees encompasses practical exercises for ra-
diation measurement teams, sampling during ac-
cidents and measurement of samples, assessment 
of accident situations and review and development 
of emergency guidelines in seminars. STUK has 
approved the emergency contingency plans of the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants and yearly reviews 
the implementation of emergency preparedness, 
including training and emergency exercises.
Two domestic emergency exercises involving 
nuclear power plants were organised. The partici-
pants to a Loviisa nuclear power plant rescue op-
erations exercise, “LOVIISA 06”, on 23 November, 
were some 50 domestic authorities or partners 
in co-operation, the media and nuclear and ra-
diation safety authorities from Russia, Sweden and 
Hungary. Initiation of activities, inter-authority 
co-operation, assessment of accident situation and 
dissemination of information to the public and the 
media were tested as well as the emergency plans, 
operation and management arrangements of the 
Itä-Uusimaa rescue services area. STUK’s emer-
gency operations were fully activated in the exer-
cise. Over 70 persons from STUK participated.
The annual Olkiluoto power plant emergency 
exercise was on 18 December. It was a tabletop 
exercise with the participating organisations work-
ing at the same premises. Thus they had the op-
portunity to follow the activities of others when 
the exercise progressed. The participants were 
the emergency response organisation of the power 
plant and, in part, those of STUK and the rescue 
services. Tested in the exercise were the assess-
ment and maintenance of an accident situation 
as well as co-operation between participating or-
ganisations, among others. At the same time, the 
participants gained a general view of the tasks 
and responsibilities of other emergency response 
organisations during an emergency response situ-
ation. 
Fire drills are arranged annually at both power 
plants with ﬁre brigades from the plants and the 
rescue services of the surrounding municipalities 
participating. Loviisa power plant’s ﬁre drill was 
on 17 May and that of Olkiluoto power plant on 13 
November.
STUK participated in international nuclear 
power plant emergency exercises during the year. 
Sweden arranged on 4 October 2006 the Falken 
exercise that was also a RESPEC exercise between 
the European Commission and STUK. STUK re-
ceived messages during the exercise, followed the 
accident status and actively relayed information 
to the European Commission about the accident’s 
progress and the migration of radioactive substanc-
es, in accordance with the Commission’s RESPEC 





STUK issued ﬁve press releases on nuclear safety 
regulation in Finland. Two press releases on events 
at Swedish nuclear power plants were issued as 
well. 
The press releases were sent to the media and 
partners in co-operation and were made available 
to read at STUK’s web page. The news section of 
the STUK web pages told about the annual main-
tenances of Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power 
plants.
Problems and delays in construction work at 
the construction site of the nuclear power plant in 
Olkiluoto made big headlines in the domestic me-
dia the whole year. In three press releases STUK 
reported its own actions i.e. the setting up of an 
investigation team and the report given by the 
team. STUK’s experts were interviewed about the 
construction site on an almost weekly basis. 
Finnish and some foreign media made several 
interviews with STUK’s experts about problems de-
tected at Swedish nuclear power plants. Forsmark 
nuclear power plant was stopped in late summer 
due to malfunctions. The exceptional INES Level 
2 event raised much interest also in Finland. It is 
described in Appendix 4.
In the spring STUK held journalists a third 
course on the fundamentals of radiation and nu-
clear safety. The participants visited nuclear power 
plants in Loviisa and Kola, Russia. Eighteen jour-
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10.1 International conventions
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent 
Fuel Management and on the Safety 
of Radioactive Waste Management
A review meeting in accordance with The 
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management was held in Vienna on 15 to 
24 May 2006. At the meeting, 40 countries and 
the Commission of the European Union reported 
their nuclear waste management arrangements. 
The participants assessed one another as regards 
the fulﬁlment of the Convention’s obligations and 
the improvements made since the 2003 meeting.
STUK sent ﬁve participants, one of which acted 
as chairman to an assessment team. The nuclear 
waste management arrangements in Finland were 
considered good. The spent nuclear fuel repository 
project in particular was considered successful. 
The project is exemplary by way of its unambigu-
ous regulations, wide acceptance locally and politi-
cally as well as its ﬁnancing arrangements.
The need for certain improvements relating 
to the maintenance of radioactive waste originat-
ing mostly from sources other than nuclear power 
plants was brought forth in the assessment pertain-
ing to Finland. It was also considered important 
that Finland pays attention to the maintenance and 
development of know-how in the long term.
In consequence of the recommendations STUK 
set up an internal work group to specify STUK’s 
duties and internal job sharing in matters relating 
to radioactive waste and to make plans for the col-
lection, intermediate storage and disposal of radio-
active small-scale waste in Finland in the long run. 
Know-how is developed by recruiting new experts 
and intensifying training and co-operation.
10.2 Co-operation in international 
organisations and bi-
lateral co-operation
Co-operation with the IAEA
The IAEA continued revision of its nuclear safety 
guidelines (formerly Nuclear Safety Series NUSS). 
STUK prepared for the IAEA statements on draft 
guidelines requested from Finland. Representatives 
of STUK contributed to the preparation of the draft 
guidelines in working groups. A representative 
of STUK continued as chairman of the NUSSC 
(nuclear safety) committee. In addition, STUK’s 
representatives were active in the WASSC (waste 
safety), TRANSSC (transport safety) and RASSC 
(radiation safety) committees.
As a result of the work of the committees, the 
IAEA published in November a new safety stand-
ard, Fundamental Safety Principles, which com-
bines the previously separate Safety Fundamentals 
publications on the safety of nuclear facilities and 
of radioactive waste handling, as well as on ra-
diation protection and radiation sources. The ten 
nuclear and radiation safety basic principles listed 
in the new standard have a safety philosophy com-
mon to all IAEA safety standards.
STUK was Finland’s liaison organisation for 
the below information exchange systems that are 
maintained by the IAEA:
• Incident Reporting System (IRS)
• Incident Reporting System for Research Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
• International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
• Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)
• Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System (NF-
CIS)




• Directory for Radioactively Contaminated Sites 
(DRCS)
• Illicit Trafﬁcking Database (ITDB)
• Events that have arisen during the Transport of 
Radioactive Material (EVTRAM)
• Discharges of Radionuclides to the Atmospheric 
and Aquatic Environment (DIRATA).
The Director General of STUK was the Vice 
Chairman of the International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group INSAG. The Group provides in-
formation and advice on nuclear safety issues to 
the Director General of the IAEA and gives recom-
mendations for safety improvements in the IAEA 
member countries.
STUK co-ordinates and implements the Finnish 
Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) 
ﬁnanced by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The 
programme’s main objectives are to develop veri-
ﬁcation methods and to train IAEA inspectors. 
FINSP continued co-operation in an international 
project to develop for the IAEA a new type of 
fuel measurement device. The IAEA’s safeguards 
inspectors were given a course on complemen-
tary access visits in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol in Finland. Based on an order from FINSP, 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland has 
been developing for the IAEA a method for produc-
ing quality control materials for environmental 
sampling. FINSP has also supported development 
of the IAEA’s nuclear material safeguards for re-
pository sites. The programme’s implementation 
was followed in meetings of the national steering 
group and in joint meetings of FINSP and the 
IAEA’s representatives.
International nuclear materials safeguards 
for repositories are being developed by ASTOR 
(Application of Safeguards to Repositories), which 
operates within the framework of the IAEA’s sup-
port programmes and reports to SAGSI, which 
assists IAEA’s management. STUK has taken an 
active part in the operation of ASTOR which es-
tablishes the framework for future safeguards 
measures. The founding meeting of ASTOR was in 
Vienna in April and the ﬁrst technical meeting in 
October.
Co-operation with the OECD/NEA
STUK was represented in all of the OECD’s main 
committees dealing with radiation and nuclear 
safety. The main committees are as follows
• Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installa-
tions (CSNI)
• Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities 
(CNRA)
• Committee on Radiation Protection and Public 
Health (CRPPH), and
• Radioactive Waste Management Committee 
(RWMC).
STUK’s Director General acted as chairman of 
the CNRA.
STUK took part in the work of the below CNRA 
Working Groups
• Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP)
• Working Group on Operating Experience 
(WGOE)
• Task Group on Regulatory Effectiveness In-
dicators (/TGRE) and Task Group on Safety 
Performance Indicators (Joint CNRA/CNSI/TG-
SPI)
• Working Group on Public Communication of 
Nuclear Regulatory Organisations (WGPC)
• Working Group on Operating Experience 
(WGOE).
CNRA’s TGRE assembled in Washington in March. 
It is not a working group proper anymore but has 
assembled regularly to discuss the use of safety 
indicators in the evaluation of regulatory effective-
ness in the various member states. Agreed upon 
were the evaluation of direct indicators and collec-
tion of data on their use on the CNRA server.
STUK took part in the work of CSNI and its 
working groups.
The ﬁelds of activity of the working groups were 
as follows
• Working Group on Integrity of Components and 
Structures (IAGE)
• Working Group on Accident and Analysis 
(GAMA)
• Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK)
• Special Expert Group on Human and Organisa-
tional Factors (SEGHOF)




Each working group holds at least one general 
meeting annually as well as the necessary topical 
meetings in which STUK’s representatives partici-
pated during 2006.
STUK contributed to the work of the Information 
System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE) of the 
CRPPH and of the Integration Group for the Safety 
Case (IGSC) of RWMC.
Co-operation with the EU
Upon the request of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, STUK participated in the work of the 
Working Party on Nuclear Safety (WPNS). Its task 
is to formulate a comment to the Working Party 
on Atomic Questions and, further, to the Council 
of the European Union. This was a follow-up task 
called for by the Council when it aborted the han-
dling of the nuclear safety package proposed by 
the European Commission. STUK participated in 
the work of two of the three WPNS subgroups 
(Subgroup 1 “Safety of Nuclear Installations” and 
Subgroup 2 “Safety of the Management of Spent 
Fuel and Radioactive Waste”). The WPNS’ work 
was accomplished. The chairman of the third sub-
group (Subgroup 3 “Financing of the decommission-
ing and dismantling of nuclear installations and ﬁ-
nancing the spent fuel and radioactive waste”) was 
from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Reports 
were completed in December according to sched-
ule.
Despite the Commission’s initiative, no new 
working groups were set up in place of the 
Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG) and 
the Concertation on European Regulatory Tasks 
(CONCERT), which were dismantled in 2005. 
Regulatory working groups based on the work done 
within the WPNS will probably be set up in 2007 
under the Council of the European Union.
STUK contributed to the work of the advisory 
Expert Group A31 of the European Commission. 
It’s main tasks pertain to radiation protection 
regulations.
An expert from STUK participated in the work 
of the Commission’s permanent working group on 
the transport on radioactive materials.
The renewal of Euratom Safeguards began 
six years ago with the objective of renewing the 
Commission’s safeguards measures such that the 
effects on the Euratom safeguards of the EU’s 
enlargement and of developments that have taken 
place in the nuclear ﬁeld, technological develop-
ments considered, are taken into account. A sec-
ondary objective was to adjust the Commission’s 
nuclear material safeguards such as to make them 
better serve the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards. 
In 2005 the Commission presented the Member 
States with new safeguards models. During 
Finland’s EU chairmanship, in conjunction with 
the Atomic Questions Group (AQG) of the Council 
of the European Union, a meeting of safeguards 
experts was arranged in STUK on 15 October. At 
the meeting, the Commission presented the docu-
ment “Implementing Euratom Treaty Safeguards”, 
which was given the ﬁnishing touches at a meeting 
in Luxembourg on 28 November. The document 
describing the Commission’s reorganised nuclear 
material safeguards is very important not only 
for the Member States but also for the IAEA safe-
guards. In the same connection the IAEA and the 
Commission began discussions on the restarting of 
High Level Liaison Committee (HLLC) meetings 
after a 5-year break. In addition to the Commission 
and the IAEA, Member States would be participat-
ing in the HLLC.
STUK participated in the EU-ﬁnanced Phare 
and Tacis co-operation in support of East European 
regulatory organisations and their support or-
ganisations. The co-operation covered participa-
tion in the activities of the Regulatory Assistance 
Management Group (RAMG) and in several in-
dividual projects the beneﬁciaries of which were 
Armenia, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. The European 
Commission was the beneﬁciary in a couple of 
projects.
The year 2006 is the last TACIS programme 
year but the projects in the programme will be im-
plemented according to plan, i.e. the last projects 
will be implemented as late as in 2010. After the 
TACIS programme, in 2000–2013, nuclear ﬁnanc-
ing will be distributed using a new instrument 
(Instrument of Nuclear Safety Co-operation (INSC) 




The 4-year research programme of NKS, Nordic 
co-operation in nuclear safety, commenced in 2002. 
The programme comprises two project entities: re-
actor safety research as well as emergency pre-
paredness and environmental safety research. 
The projects are headed by programme manag-
ers. STUK’s experts participated in projects of the 
emergency preparedness and environmental safety 
research programme. STUK played an active role 
in the work of the NKS steering committee.
The project entity on reactor safety contains 
projects relating to Finland’s publicly ﬁnanced 
SAFIR research programme. The emergency pre-
paredness and environmental safety programme 
includes focus areas important to Finland such as 
development of information management and com-
munication during emergencies. The programme 
was evaluated and a seminar was held encompass-
ing the 2002–2005 programme period. The steering 
committee started a renewal of the framework 
programme.
The programme’s content serves well co-opera-
tion between the Nordic authorities, which is a per-
manent objective of NKS co-operation.
Bilateral co-operation
STUK’s representative was a member of the 
Reactor Safety Committee that assists the Swedish 
Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). Co-operation 
with SKI continued with regular meetings during 
which current questions of nuclear safety regula-
tion, emergency preparedness, waste management 
and nuclear material safeguards were discussed.
Two experts from the Hungarian Atomic Energy 
Authority (HAEA) worked for two months at STUK 
through the IAEA’s Fellowship Visitor programme. 
They evaluated the regulations and ways of action 
in use at STUK and HAEA as regards operation, 
quality management, operational experience feed-
back and training in particular.
STUK’s Director General was chairman of a 
nuclear safety committee that supports the organi-
sation conducting regulatory activities in Belgium 
and participated as a permanent member in the 
work of a corresponding advisory committee sup-
porting the Lithuanian nuclear regulatory author-
ity.
An agreement with The United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (USNRC) about the ex-
change of technical information and co-operation 
was renewed in September. It is for ﬁve years at a 
time and is about the exchange of information on 
matters pertaining to regulation of, and require-
ments for, nuclear facilities.
A mutual agreement on information exchange 
and co-operation as regards the safety of nucle-
ar facilities and the ﬁnal disposal of radioactive 
waste was signed with the Korean Institute of 
Nuclear Safety of the Republic of Korea (KINS) in 
September.
STUK’s representative was a member in 
the French Groupe permanent d’experts charge 
Réacteurs (GPR) and participated in meetings 
dealing with the EPR plant that is due for con-
struction in Flamanville. He also participated in 
the joint meeting of the advisory committees on 
nuclear safety of major nuclear power states in 
Washington. The joint meeting was attended by 
France’s GPR, Germany’s RSK, the US’s ACRS 
and Japan’s NSC as well as the separately invited 
Sweden, Switzerland and Finland.
STUK collaborated with the French authority 
as regards regulatory control of the design, manu-
facturing and construction of the new plant project. 
At meetings, information was exchanged about 
design solutions, construction status, construction 
oversight, experiences gained on the manufactur-
ing of main components, accident analyses and 
aircraft impact analyses.
Safeguards co-operation between STUK and 
the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation 
Ofﬁce (ASNO) continued. In accordance with the 
agreed practice, STUK provided ASNO with infor-
mation on nuclear materials of Australian origin 
imported to Finland.
Under ﬁnancing from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, STUK is engaged in bilateral co-operation 
with nuclear power plants in Russia’s neighbour-
ing areas and with the Russian regulatory safety 
authority. The prevention of nuclear accidents is 
enhanced by expert services and component de-
liveries. Mitigation of local environmental risks 
and terror threats encompass the support given to 
nuclear waste management projects and projects to 
prevent illicit shipments of radioactive substances. 
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The support given to the development of radiation 
monitoring systems in the vicinity of nuclear power 
plants and to the development of accident response 
readiness ensures reliable information on potential 
disturbances or accidents. STUK co-ordinates the 
co-operation, carries out some of the expert work 
itself and commissions the rest to operators in the 
ﬁeld.
The co-operation themes in 2006 were training 
of the power plant’s operating and maintenance 
personnel, component acquisitions to ascertain the 
integrity of pressure-bearing components plus user 
training, corrosion protection projects, ﬁre safety 
improvements and training, access control systems 
renewals and co-operation in safety analysis. In ad-
dition, STUK compiled a progress report on safety 
developments at, and the present condition of, the 
two oldest units of Leningrad power plant for pub-
lication as one entity.
When collaborating with other authorities, 
STUK regularly read semi-annual reports from the 
resident inspectors of Rostechnadzor at the Kola 
and Leningrad nuclear power plants. They contain 
descriptions of safety signiﬁcant events and safety 
improvement projects at the plants. A seminar on 
the experiences gained from the PSA analyses of 
VVER reactors was held at STUK.
The data transmission and direct alarm connec-
tions of external radiation monitoring networks in 
the environment of Leningrad and Kola nuclear 
power plants were maintained through co-opera-
tion in the ﬁelds of accident preparedness and 
radiation safety. STUK’s representatives attended 
the commissioning of the new premises of a local 
emergency preparedness centre in St Petersburg. 
STUK’s representative was an observer at the 
Russian annual national emergency exercise at 
Novovoronesh nuclear power plant.
In the ﬁeld of co-operation in nuclear waste 
management, safety assessment of the commis-
sioning of nuclear facilities and the cementation 
of liquid wastes was addressed at a joint seminar 
between STUK and the Russian nuclear safety 
authority. STUK contributes actively to the work 
of the Contact Expert Group for international ra-
dioactive waste projects in Russia (CEG). CEG co-
ordinates assistance in nuclear waste matters from 
the West to Russia. A CEG seminar on radioactive 
waste disposal was held in Olkiluoto in June and 
STUK contributed to the arrangements.
Regulations were further developed within the 
framework of the bilateral nuclear non-prolifera-
tion support programme between Finland and 
Russia. The manufacturing of a spent fuel attribute 
tester (SFAT) for use by Kola nuclear power plant 
was completed at STUK and its functioning was 
tested at Loviisa power plant. Based on the teach-
ings of the St Petersburg Customs Academy, a 
renewed course on customs matters was arranged 
in February. STUK participated in international 
co-operation meetings to ascertain awareness of 
the “Illicit-Trafﬁcking” situation.
Other forms of co-operation
STUK participated in the work of the Western 
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association 
(WENRA). In 2000, a working group on harmonisa-
tion was set up to develop a method of drawing up 
uniform nuclear safety requirements. In accord-
ance with the recommendations of the working 
group’s ﬁnal report, an extensive nuclear safety 
requirements and nuclear waste management de-
velopment project was commenced in early 2003.
Nuclear safety requirements for 17 safety ar-
eas were formulated in the project. The status of 
requirements in the 18 participating countries was 
analysed. The results were introduced to the repre-
sentatives of industry, utilities and other interested 
organisations in a seminar in Brussels early in the 
year. After the seminar, comments on the reference 
requirements were requested from European and 
national organisations. STUK requested the licen-
sees’ opinions on the requirements and also their 
assessments of their fulﬁlment at the Finnish nu-
clear facilities. The WENRA working group contin-
ued work on the development of the requirements 
during the second half of the year. Towards the end 
of the year the requirements were being given the 
ﬁnishing touches by the regulatory heads of the 
WENRA countries.
STUK was active in WENRA’s decommission-
ing and nuclear waste working group, which put 
out draft reference requirements for the decom-
missioning of nuclear facilities and the storage of 
nuclear waste. The implementation status of the 
requirements will be evaluated in 2007.
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The working group on safety-critical software 
that operated under the NRWG, which was abol-
ished by the Commission of the European Union, 
continued its work at WENRA’s request and put 
the ﬁnishing touches to the document “Licensing 
of safety critical software for nuclear reactors. 
Common position of European nuclear regulators 
and safety authorities”. The document was complet-
ed in early 2007. The working group comprises rep-
resentatives from Belgium, Spain, France, Sweden, 
Germany, Finland and the United Kingdom.
STUK participated in the Multinational Design 
Evaluation Programme (MDEP), an international 
project to develop a model for the multinational 
safety assessment of new nuclear power plants. The 
US nuclear safety authority, the NRC, started the 
project that encompasses two simultaneous phas-
es. Phase 1 concerns the safety assessment of EPR 
type nuclear power plants, the participants being 
France, Finland and the USA. In practice Phase 1 
is continuation to bilateral co-operation between 
France and Finland’s nuclear safety authorities, 
now joined by the USA. Ten countries contribute 
to Phase 2. In addition to those mentioned above: 
Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Russia, South Africa 
and Great Britain. The secretariat of Phase 2 is 
the OECD’s NEA, the IAEA participating as well. 
Regulatory practices and requirements relating 
to the approval of nuclear power plants are due 
for assessment during Phase 2: safety objectives, 
grounds for approval and inspection routines will 
be ﬁrst on the list. Severe accidents, requirements 
for emergency cooling systems design, program-
mable automation and mechanical components 
were chosen as the areas to be focused on ﬁrst. 
The target in the fourth area is to deﬁne objectives 
by which authorities in different countries can 
co-operate in assessing the manufacturing of new 
components.
The working group on risk analysis set up by 
the VVER Regulators Forum in Finland in 2005 
is a continuation of the working group on risk 
that was set up in 2002 and completed its work 
in 2005. The Forum gave the new working group 
the task to continue comparison calculations for 
new accident initiating events and to identify the 
causes of differences in risk analyses. The new 
project spans three years. The group held its ﬁrst 
meeting in Finland in 2006 and decided to compare 
initiating events used in the Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis (PSA) of VVER plants, speciﬁcally: loss 
of the service water system, loss of the feed water 
system, breaking of steam generator tubing as well 
as risk analysis methods for ﬁres and low power 
levels. A decision was made to compare different 
countries’ risk assessment requirements as well 
as legislation and regulations. A decision was also 
made to compare the member countries’ PSA ap-
plications as well as the ability and availability 
of support organisations operating in the member 
countries to draw up a PSA and its applications. At 
a meeting in Vienna in December, risk analyses for 
the loss of sea water systems at VVER plants were 
reviewed and further analyses to be made in 2007 
were decided upon. STUK hosted a summer meet-
ing of the I&C working group of the VVER Forum 
in Helsinki, taking an active role in the prepara-
tion of the group’s report. The work is anticipated 
to continue for some more years. The report deals 
with the member countries’ experiences in the 
licensing of digital I&C. The section of the report, 
which was assigned to STUK, is almost completed.
STUK participated in the work of the Network 
of Regulators of Small Nuclear Programs (NERS). 
It is a channel via which information about the 
ways of action and experiences of colleagues work-
ing on similar-sized nuclear energy programmes 
can be exchanged. Nuclear safety authorities from 
countries outside Europe, Argentina, South Africa 
and Pakistan participate in the co-operation. Four 
topics were discussed during the year, namely age-
ing management at nuclear power plants, plant 
life management as well as oversight of radioac-
tive sources, wastes and radioactive materials 
transport. The Pakistani authority maintains a 
site (www.ners.info) containing information about 
nuclear power plant safety in the countries partici-
pating in the co-operation.
As regards physical protection in the nuclear 
ﬁeld, STUK has participated in the work of the 
European Nuclear Security Regulators Association 
(ENSRA) and in that of the Fysiskt skydd i Nordisk 
kärnteknisk verksamhet (NORDFYS).
STUK is a member of the Nordic working group 




11 The advisory committee 
on nuclear safety
Pekka Salminen
In accordance with Section 56 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987), the preliminary prepara-
tion of matters relating to the safe use of nuclear 
energy is vested with the Advisory Committee on 
Nuclear Safety. The Committee is appointed by 
the Government and it functions in conjunction 
with STUK. Its term of ofﬁce is three years. The 
Committee was appointed on 10 September 2003 
and its term of ofﬁce ended on 9 September 2006. A 
new Committee was appointed on 1 October 2006 
for the next 3-year period.
The Committee’s Chairman was Professor 
Pentti Lautala (Tampere University of Technology) 
and its Vice-Chairman was Head of Research 
Rauno Rintamaa (VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland). The members were Professor 
Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki (Lappeenranta Technical 
University), Director Ulla Koivusaari (Pirkanmaa 
Regional Environment Centre), Development 
Director Timo Okkonen (INSPECTA OY), Senior 
Researcher Ilona Lindholm (VTT) and Branch 
Manager Runar Blomqvist (the Geological Survey of 
Finland). Professor Jukka Laaksonen, the Director 
General of STUK, was a permanent expert to the 
Committee. An invited expert was Dr. Sc. (Tech.) 
Antti Vuorinen. In the autumn Professor Lautala 
left the Committee and the Government appointed 
Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki as the new Chairman. Antti 
Vuorinen was appointed full member of the new 
Committee.
The Committee convened six times. It prepared 
statements to STUK on seven YVL guides under 
revision. The preparation of a statement on one 
more draft guide was started. The Committee 
heard a STUK representative about the plans for a 
new SAFIR research programme, followed regular-
ly the progress of the construction of the Olkiluoto 
3 plant unit and operating events at the operat-
ing nuclear facilities, and participated, together 
with the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Energy, 
in the organising of an annual nuclear energy 
seminar. It convened once at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant, speciﬁcally acquainting itself with 
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction and 
hearing the management of Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy about problems detected during construction 
(concreting problems).
The Committee took a step forward in interna-
tional co-operation: its representatives met with 
members of the French National Public Debate 
Commission (CNDP) during the year and were 
invited to participate in the meeting in the USA 
of a body of co-operation established by the major 
nuclear power states (the USA, France, Germany, 
Japan).
